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COURT-CONNECTED ADR—A TIME OF 
CRISIS, A TIME OF CHANGE 
YISHAI BOYARIN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Court-connected alternative dispute resolution (court ADR)—ADR 
programs organized, funded, run, or endorsed by the courts—has come 
a long way since it first emerged in the 1970s.  However, court ADR still 
faces some major challenges; the primary challenge is the lack of 
institutional support—both financially and policy-wise—needed to run 
high-quality court ADR programs that, to borrow from Professor 
Lawrence Susskind, are not just “efficient” but also lead to “wise,” 
“fair,” and “stable” results.1 
One of the main reasons for the lack of institutional support stems 
from the fact that the courts have not fully embraced what ADR was 
meant to offer: efficient and effective conflict resolution processes that 
do not compromise, and perhaps even enhance, perceptions and 
experiences of fairness and justice.2  Instead, court ADR appears to 
 
* Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, Director of the Mediation Clinic, Hofstra 
University School of Law.  I would like to thank Peter Salem, Andrew Schepard, Susan 
Yates, and Nancy Welsh for their extensive comments and suggestions, as well as Bobbi 
McAdoo, Timothy Hedeen, Nancy Ver Steegh, and Andrea Schneider for their feedback on 
this Report.  I would also like to thank the Marquette student reporters, Sarah Wong and 
Megan Sorey, for their diligent work, as well as Pamela Rubin and Christine Garcia of 
Hofstra for their research help.  Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to the 
Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, Marquette University Law School, and 
Resolution Systems Institute for convening the Court ADR conference, and to the JAMS 
Foundation for its financial support. 
1. See Panel Discussion, Core Values of Dispute Resolution: Is Neutrality Necessary?, 95 
MARQ. L. REV. 805, 816 (2012) (statements of Professor Susskind). 
2. As stated by the Honorable A. Leon Higginbotham,  
 
By all means let us reform that process, let us make it more swift, more 
efficient, and less expensive, but above all let us make it more just. . . .  
Let us not, in our zeal to reform our process, make the powerless into 
victims who can secure relief neither in the court nor anywhere else. 
See Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on Looking: 
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focus more and more on “‘efficiency for the sake of efficiency.’”3  
Efficiency, however, cannot and should not be the only focus of court 
ADR programs; because courts fund and authorize ADR programs as 
well as mandate parties to participate in them, they are also responsible 
for ensuring the quality of court ADR programs. 
Over the past thirty-five to forty years, there have been a number of 
parallel efforts to establish court ADR programs within various legal 
contexts—efforts that have produced, and continue to produce, a wide 
and rich body of knowledge about ADR.  Although much progress has 
been made, these efforts tend to be somewhat fragmented—courts, 
ADR professionals, and scholars that work in the family context have 
often followed one trajectory, while those who operate in the broader 
civil context followed others.  Moreover, there is divergence in the types 
of challenges being faced and innovations put forth even within 
individual substantive areas of law where ADR is practiced.  Along with 
these differences, there are also multiple areas of overlap and there is 
potential for cross-enrichment.  Due to the existing challenges to court 
ADR—which are significantly enhanced by the current financial 
downturn’s impact on courts’ budgets and ADR programs, the rise in 
pro se litigants and high conflict, and the proliferation of non-English 
speaking litigants—there is an urgent need for proponents of court 
ADR to join forces, share the lessons learned so far, and articulate a 
clear vision for the future of court ADR. 
With these challenges and needs in mind, the Association of Family 
and Conciliation Courts (AFCC), Marquette University Law School, 
and Resolution System Institute (RSI) convened this conference 
(entitled The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond and hosted 
by the Marquette University Law School) to examine the status of court 
ADR programs in the general civil context4 and in the specific family 
 
Lessons from the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 403 
(2005) (alteration in original) (quoting A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Priority of Human 
Rights in Court Reform, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE 
FUTURE 87, 110 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979) [hereinafter POUND 
PROCEEDINGS]).  
3. McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 404 (quoting POUND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, 
at 300). 
4. Civil court ADR refers to a wide range of substantive areas of law other than family 
law, such as employment, housing, foreclosure, bankruptcy, small claims, general torts, and 
contract disputes. 
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context (family ADR).5  The overall goal of the conference was to start 
shaping an agenda for the future of family and civil court ADR.  
Particular emphasis was placed on examining new ADR and case-
management options as they relate to the use of the mediation process.  
The conference, convened over two days and in two parts, gathered 
leading ADR scholars and practitioners from the family and civil ADR 
contexts.  The discussions were designed to encourage cross-learning 
between the family ADR and the broader ADR communities.  The first 
day started by revisiting and expanding upon the classic 1981 debate 
between Professors Lawrence Susskind and Joseph Stulburg over the 
core values of mediation—mainly self-determination, impartiality, and 
fairness—and the interplay between them, while adding in the family 
perspective and placing the debate in the present context.6  This session 
then shifted to considering the potential roles of ADR interveners that 
may not conform with the classic mediation definition of the third-party 
intervener.  Following this initial framing session, titled Core Values of 
Dispute Resolution—Is Neutrality Necessary?, the conference 
highlighted some of the perspectives and key considerations of ADR 
stakeholders: judges, lawyers, ADR practitioners, and various categories 
of parties impacted by ADR programs.  The first day of the conference 
then progressed to an examination of innovative ADR processes as well 
as multi-intervention ADR systems.7   
During the second day, the participants were divided into groups 
that discussed a (non-exhaustive) list of five topics that were identified 
by the conference participants as central to the future of ADR.8  Each 
 
5. For a full description of the conference and for other related resources, please visit 
THE FUTURE OF COURT ADR: MEDIATION AND BEYOND, 
http://law.marquette.edu/courtadr/ (last visited May 4, 2012). 
6. For the original debate, compare Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and 
the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981), with Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and 
Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85 (1981).  Professors 
Susskind and Stulberg were present at the opening plenary session, along with Dr. Bernard 
Mayer, as the third panelist, and Professor John Lande, as the moderator.  See Panel 
Discussion, supra note 1. 
7. The term “system” as used here and throughout the Report is defined as “one or 
more internal processes that have been adopted to prevent, manage or resolve a stream of 
disputes.”  See Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute 
Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 126 (2009) (footnote omitted). 
8. The five topics were (1) discussion among public policy mediators regarding the 
design of a process to develop, reform, or enhance services in family disputes; (2) the impact 
 
17 - BOYARIN-11 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2012  10:41 PM 
996 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:993 
group came up with a number of important suggestions about its 
particular topic.  The goal of the second day of the conference was to 
begin outlining, in practical terms, what efforts need to be undertaken to 
support and promote the implementation of innovative ADR systems. 
This Report contains specific conclusions and recommendations, 
most made by the participants themselves and others derived from the 
discussions that took place before, during, and after the conference.9  
Part II of the Report will provide a brief background of court ADR and 
will outline some of the challenges faced by it.  Part III will explore the 
principles and goals of mediation and some of the central challenges to 
the achievement of these aspirational goals within the context of court-
connected mediation programs.  Part IV will move beyond mediation 
and turn to other ADR processes, looking at specific interventions 
discussed in detail in the conference: Early Neutral Evaluation (ENE), 
which is practiced both in the family and general civil contexts, and 
Parenting Coordination (PC), which is practiced in the family context 
only.  Part V will examine how ADR interventions may be offered 
within a multi-intervention ADR system: the tiered and triage 
approaches.  Part VI will summarize some of key considerations raised 
by the conference attendees that are viewed as central to the future of 
ADR.  Part VII will outline some suggestions made by conference 
attendees for promoting well designed and supported ADR programs.  
Finally, Part VIII will briefly conclude the Report. 
II.  COURT ADR: BACKGROUND AND CHALLENGES 
The emergence of court ADR is often traced to the Pound 
Conference, where Professor Frank Sander posited that cases should be 
 
of socioeconomic status on ADR services; (3) self-represented and unrepresented litigants; 
(4) strategies for developing champions of the court system; and (5) the vision of court ADR 
in 2030.  See Reporter’s Notes, Marquette University Law School Symposium on The Future 
of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond (Sept. 23–24, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Reporter’s Notes]. 
9. The conference included recommended readings both from the family and broader 
civil context, many authored by presenters at the conference.  See Recommended Reading 
List, THE FUTURE OF COURT ADR: MEDIATION AND BEYOND, 
http://law.marquette.edu/courtadr/?page_id=139 (last visited Apr. 2, 2012).  This Report 
draws most of its sources from these readings, intertwining them with the presentations and 
discussions that took place in the conference.  It should be noted that the Report contains, in 
part, the summary and perspective of the Report’s author and has not been reviewed by most 
of the conference attendees. 
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channeled to a variety of processes based on particular criteria, 
including the nature of the dispute, the relationship between the 
disputants, the amount in dispute, and the cost and speed of the 
process.10  The Pound Conference attendees envisioned ADR as 
providing varied conflict resolution services that would be more 
responsive to the needs of parties entering the court system without 
compromising the judicial mandate to provide for fairness and justice.11  
In response to the Pound Conference and Professor Sander’s call for a 
“multi-door courthouse,” the process of institutionalizing ADR began12 
(although initially in a relatively fragmented manner rather than 
through a systematic, national rollout of any kind).13 
At the same time, family court service agencies started developing 
mediation out of existing processes, such as custody evaluation and 
conciliation counseling.14  For example, court staff members were 
trained as mediators beginning with a pilot program in the Los Angeles 
Conciliation Court in 1973.15  Similarly, the Family Self-Determination 
 
10. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 402 & n.18 (citing Frank E.A. Sander, 
Varieties of Disputing Process, in POUND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 65, 67). 
11. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 402–05; see also John Lande, How Much 
Justice Can We Afford?: Defining the Courts’ Roles and the Appropriate Number of Trials, 
Settlement Signals, and Other Elements Needed to Administer Justice, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 
213, 221–28 & nn.54–55 (2006) (summarizing various perspectives on the role of the court in 
ensuring justice); Bobbi McAdoo, All Rise, the Court Is in Session: What Judges Say About 
Court-Connected Mediation, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 377, 380 (2007); Smith & 
Martinez, supra note 7, at 129–30; Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation 
in a Democratic Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 142–43 (2004) 
[hereinafter Welsh, Court-Connected]. 
12. See McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 399 (stating that “[w]hen Professor Frank 
Sander introduced the concept of the multi-door courthouse at the Pound Conference, the 
great experiment with the institutionalization of court ADR—particularly mediation—
began”). 
13. The closest ADR has come to a national rollout was through the federal Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2006), which encouraged 
experimentation in ADR and case-management. 
14. Jay Folberg, Facilitating Agreement—The Role of Counseling in the Courts, 
CONCILIATION COURTS REV., Dec. 1974, at 17, 17–20; Ann Milne, Custody of Children in a 
Divorce Process: A Family Self-Determination Model, CONCILIATION COURTS REV., Sept. 
1978, at 1, 1–2; Peter Salem et al., Triaging Family Court Services: The Connecticut Judicial 
Branch’s Family Civil Intake Screen, 27 PACE L. REV. 741, 744–45 (2007). 
15. See Nancy Thoennes, Peter Salem & Jessica Pearson, Mediation and Domestic 
Violence, 33 FAM. COURTS REV. 6, 6 (1995). 
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program was started in 1974 in Dane County, Wisconsin.16  By 1980, 
California mandated mediation in all child-custody disputes,17 and within 
a decade, family mediation had spread to thirty-eight states and 
Washington, D.C.18 
While court ADR serves a very important function within the 
overall dispute resolution process and appears to be destined to remain 
a permanent part of it, court ADR is not fully meeting its aspired to 
original goals of providing multiple efficient, effective, and fair ADR 
services.  Instead of the hoped-for multi-door courthouse, most 
jurisdictions19 offer mediation as the only ADR service.  Moreover, the 
types of mediation services offered do not always provide parties with 
the opportunity to determine the outcome of their dispute on their own 
terms in a non-coercive environment.20  In fact, the manner in which 
ADR is being practiced—and particularly mediation as the most 
prominently offered ADR service—tends to be more coercive, with 
diminished fairness safeguards,21 and as some commentators argue, with 
potentially negative impacts particularly on the poor, minorities, and 
women.22 
Both civil and family ADR programs currently operate within a 
difficult climate.  Courts are dealing with increasing caseloads and 
decreasing resources.23  There is a risk that the most recent budget crisis 
 
16. Milne, supra note 14, at 1–2. 
17. See Leonard Edwards, Comments on the Miller Commission Report: A California 
Perspective, 27 PACE L. REV. 627, 633 (2007). 
18. See Salem et al., supra note 14, at 745. 
19. There are some notable exceptions.  See, e.g., Peter Salem, The Emergence of Triage 
in Family Court Services: The Beginning of the End for Mandatory Mediation?, 47 FAM. CT. 
REV. 371, 373–74 (2009); Smith & Martinez, supra note 7, at 146. 
20. See Salem, supra note 19, at 377; Nancy Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-
Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2001) [hereinafter Welsh, Thinning Vision]. 
21. Timothy Hedeen, Coercion and Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: 
All Mediations Are Voluntary, But Some Are More Voluntary Than Others, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 
273, 276–85 (2005); McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 430 (stating that the “tendency to 
order all parties into mediation regardless of its appropriateness, as well as some mediators’ 
tendency to behave in an overaggressive manner” can and should be curved); Welsh, 
Thinning Vision, supra note 20, at 5–6. 
22. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Staying in Orbit, or Breaking Free: The Relationship of 
Mediation to the Courts over Four Decades, 84 N.D. L. REV. 705, 731 (2008). 
23. See Salem et al., supra note 14, at 743 (noting that “[f]or years, family court service 
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might enhance courts’ and court administrators’ tendency to perceive 
ADR as a tool in the narrow service of short-term efficiency.  Focusing 
on short-term efficiency, although an important goal for court ADR 
programs, often compromises the innovative characteristics of ADR 
interventions when it is the dominant goal.24  Indeed, when discussing 
the landscape of court ADR, multiple conference participants 
emphasized administrative-cost considerations and the financial crisis as 
probably the most critical factors to the future of court ADR, and in 
light of the current trend, some emphasized the need to preserve that 
which is unique about court ADR.25 
While the resources available to courts (in general) and court ADR 
programs (in particular) are shrinking, the need to provide high-quality 
ADR services and better case management to parties is mounting.  One 
reason for this increase in the need for good services is the surge in pro 
se litigants who do not know how to navigate the court system, ADR 
included.26  A related problem is the proliferation of non-native English 
speakers, which further magnifies the inaccessibility of the court system 
 
agencies have faced the challenge of a growing number of referrals of increasing complexity, 
while staffing and other resources have remained level or, in some cases, been cut”).  See 
generally AM. BAR ASSOC., REPORT: CRISIS IN THE COURTS: DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
(2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/public_education/ 
pub-ed-lawday_abare solution_crisiscourtsdec2011.pdf. 
24. James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A 
Survey of the Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 171, 205–06 (2001); Wayne D. Brazil, 
Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found A Better Way?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RES. 93, 121–22 (2002); Nancy A. Welsh, You’ve Got Your Mother’s Laugh: What Bankruptcy 
Mediation Can Learn from the Her/History of Divorce and Child Custody Mediation, 17 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 427, 439 (2009) [hereinafter Welsh, Mother’s Laugh]. 
25. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 822 (statement of Professor Susskind) (stating 
that it is not enough to argue that ADR saves time and money; rather, ADR must provide for 
an outcome that is “fair, efficient, stable and wise”); id. at 807–08 (quoting ELLEN 
WALDMAN, MEDIATION ETHICS: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 117–18 (2011) (stating that 
many are concerned that it is hard to tell the difference between traditional judicial 
intervention and ADR mediation). 
26. In fact, this was widely discussed throughout the conference and was designated as 
one of the key issues for the future of ADR by the conference attendees as reflected in their 
choice to make the issue of pro se litigants one of the five areas of focus.  For further 
discussion, see supra notes 2, 6, 9–10 and accompanying text.  Another strongly related area of 
focus designated as central to the future of ADR was economic status.  See Salem et al., supra 
note 14, at 746–48. 
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to many.27  These challenges are compounded by the rise in high 
conflict,28 often resulting in relitigation,29 as well as by the foreclosure 
crisis and the severe economic downturn. Courts serving families face 
additional unique challenges: incidents of reported domestic violence, 
abuse and neglect, and substance abuse are more widespread, which 
further complicate the manner in which justice is administered to 
families.30  These mounting needs, both in family and general civil 
disputes, often require a wide range of ADR interventions alongside the 
traditional, adversarial litigation option.   
The pressures that court-ADR programs are facing can trigger a 
“circling of the wagons” mentality within the ADR community aimed at 
preserving what is already in place.  Or, it can lead to a careful look at 
the existing ADR programs with an eye toward enhancing them to meet 
both courts’ goals and parties’ needs without compromising the unique 
ADR innovations and the fairness and justice functions ADR must 
serve.31  The primary focus of the conference was on the latter approach: 
to improve and grow ADR based on some of the successful models 
already in existence, utilizing the knowledge and expertise accumulated 
 
27. See ALFRED P. CARLTON, JR., ABA, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 64 (2003), 
http://www.abavideonews.org/ABA263/finalreport.pdf (stating that “Courts should enact 
measures to minimize language barriers so that non-English speaking citizens are not 
deterred from pursuing their legal rights in American courts”). 
28. Salem et al., supra note 14, at 746 (stating that high conflict is “‘identified by 
multiple, overlapping criteria: high rates of litigation and relitigation, high degrees of anger 
and distrust, incidents of verbal abuse, intermittent physical aggression, and ongoing difficulty 
communicating about and cooperating over the care of their children.’” (quoting JANET R. 
JOHNSTON & VIVIENNE ROSEBY, IN THE NAME OF THE CHILD: A DEVELOPMENTAL 
APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING AND HELPING CHILDREN OF HIGH-CONFLICT AND 
VIOLENT FAMILIES 4–5 (1997)).   
29. Salem et al., supra note 14, at 746–47. 
30. Id. at 747 (stating that “[i]ncreased levels of reporting and incidence of domestic 
violence, child abuse and neglect and chemical dependency add significant complications to 
the dispute resolution process”). 
31. See Timothy Hedeen, Remodeling the Multi-door Courthouse to “Fit the Forum to 
the Folks”: How Screening and Preparation Will Enhance ADR, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 941, 944 
(2012); Julie Macfarlane, ADR and the Courts: Renewing our Commitment to Innovation, 95 
MARQ. L. REV. 927, 928–29 (2012); Nancy A. Welsh, The Current Transitional State of Court-
Connected ADR, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 873, 877 (2012). 
17 - BOYARIN-11 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2012  10:41 PM 
2012] A TIME OF CRISIS, A TIME OF CHANGE 1001 
since the emergence of ADR due to research and experience.32  This 
Report hopes to contribute toward these efforts. 
The next four Parts of the Report, Parts III–VI, will initially focus on 
mediation and the role of the mediator; shift toward the broader role of 
an ADR intervener, whether as a neutral in the classic mediation sense 
or otherwise; and finally turn to the importance of clarity in goal-setting, 
design, and implementation of ADR programs.  This progression 
mirrors and expands upon the conference-framing plenary session. 
III.  COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION  
Despite Professor Sander’s call for a “multi-door courthouse,” 
mediation became the primary ADR process in the family and broader 
civil arenas.33  In the family context, California was the first to adopt 
statewide, mandatory mediation in all custody disputes in 1980,34 and 
approximately thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia followed 
suit.35  In the civil context, most programs offer “essentially only one 
process—a malleable, hybrid form of mediation.”36  Since court-
connected mediation was the launching point for the discussion of court 
ADR that exists beyond mediation, this Report will start by briefly 
discussing court-connected mediation to provide some context for the 
“beyond.”37  In fact, mediation is not only the central component of any 
ADR program, both presently and likely in the future, but it also has 
been one of the most researched and debated court ADR processes.38  
As a result, reviewing the discussion concerning mediation provides the 
 
32. See Hedeen, supra note 31, at 941–42; Macfarlane, supra note 31, at 939; Welsh, 
supra note 31, at 879.  
33. Salem et al., supra note 14, at 744; see also McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 403.  
34. Edwards, supra note 17, at 633; see also Salem et al., supra note 14, at 745 (stating 
that mandatory mediation started in California in 1981). 
35. Salem et al., supra note 14, at 745; Carrie-Anne Tondo et al., Note, Mediation 
Trends: A Survey of the States, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 431, 433 (2001). 
36. Brazil, supra note 24, at 116. 
37. Mediation was not the central theme of the conference and, therefore, was not 
discussed in depth; the context-setting discussion in this Part is based, unless noted otherwise, 
on the author’s perspective rather than those attending the conference. 
38. See, e.g., Bobbi McAdoo, Nancy A. Welsh & Roselle A. Wissler, Institutionalization: 
What Do Empirical Studies Tell Us About Court Mediation?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 
2003, at 8. 
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best context for examining some important questions relevant to all 
other types of ADR systems.  
A.  The Goals of Mediation and Court-Connected Challenges 
Most proponents of mediation envisioned a process founded on the 
idea of providing parties with the opportunity to self-determine the 
outcome of their dispute.39  Although not in a uniform manner, a broad 
understanding of self-determination has gradually narrowed, a 
narrowing that directly impacts the manner in which mediation is 
practiced.40  This “thinning” self-determination is in major part a result 
of the potential, but not necessary, tension between the goal of self-
determination and an over focus on narrow administrative efficiency 
considerations.41 
Mediation was originally intended as a voluntary and informal 
process designed to empower parties to explore the resolution of their 
disputes on their own terms rather than within the existing adversarial 
and legally rigid formal process.42  These goals are often encapsulated 
within the concept of self-determination, originally understood as the 
promise that the parties will have the power to determine the outcome 
of their dispute in a non-coercive, voluntary environment.43  The process 
 
39. Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 20, at 7–8. 
40. Id. at 25–26. 
41. Alfini & McCabe, supra note 24, at 205–06; Dorothy J. Della Noce, Joseph P. Folger 
& James R. Antes, Assimilative, Autonomous, or Synergistic Visions: How Mediation 
Programs in Florida Address the Dilemma of Court Connection, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 11, 
29–32 (2002); Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, in THE NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 
165, 171 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006). 
42. See Brazil, supra note 24, at 109; Welsh, Mother’s Laugh, supra note 24, at 454; 
Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 20, at 4 (“[T]he originally dominant vision of self-
determination assumed that the disputing parties would be the principal actors and creators 
within the mediation process.  The parties would: 1) actively and directly participate in the 
communication and negotiation that occurs during mediation, 2) choose and control the 
substantive norms to guide their decision-making, 3) create the options for settlement, and 4) 
control the final decision regarding whether or not to settle.”).  
43. Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 810–12 (statement of Professor Stulberg) (arguing 
that mediation is unique because it promotes self-determination and personal responsibility 
and should focus on allowing parties to make an informed decision that is not just based on 
legal rights and to order their lives as a political community); Salem, supra note 19, at 375 
(stating that “[t]he argument for the importance of self-determination that mediation offers is 
as follows: If parents are able to participate in mediation, they will be better able to fully 
explore options, truly hear one another, and ultimately be empowered to make their own 
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characteristics incorporated into mediation in support of this 
understanding of self-determination are the voluntary participation and 
decision-making by the parties, as well as the neutrality of the third-
party mediator.44  Confidentiality is also a significant characteristic 
meant to guarantee the open and non-coercive nature of mediation.45 
As reflected in the opening plenary session of the conference, how 
these characteristics are precisely defined and how they interplay can 
vary.  Some, like Professor Susskind, would argue that while the parties 
should determine their own outcome, the mediator has a responsibility 
to ensure that the outcome is of the best quality and as fair as can be, 
not only as applied to the parties but also to others that may be 
impacted by the results.46  Others, like Professor Stulberg, argue that 
making the mediator responsible for the outcome would inevitably 
undermine self-determination and, therefore, must be rejected;47 instead, 
the focus in mediation should be on allowing the parties themselves to 
decide what is right for them.48  While this debate reflects variance, it 
also shows that these characteristics of mediation have been and still are 
central to the practice of mediation, even if the precise manner of 
implementation may vary in practice.49  Indeed, mediation proponents 
generally believe that adherence to the core characteristics of mediation 
in the actual practice of mediation is necessary to ensure that mediation 
meets the goal of self-determination.50 
 
decisions that determine their own future”); see also Welsh, Mother’s Laugh, supra note 24, at 
432; Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 20, at 18–20. 
44. Alfini & McCabe, supra note 24, at 173; Welsh, Mother’s Laugh, supra note 24, at 
432; Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 20, at 92 (stating that “[s]elf-determination has been 
identified as the fundamental, core characteristic of the mediation process”). 
45. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 8 (2003).   
46. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 809; Reporter’s Notes, supra note 8. 
47. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 811; Reporter’s Notes, supra note 8. 
48. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 811; Reporter’s Notes, supra note 8.  For an 
additional perspective on the issue of power-balancing in mediation, see Robert A. Baruch 
Bush & Joseph P. Folger, Mediation and Social Justice: Risks and Opportunities, 27 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 35–48 (2012), which discusses “party-centered” mediation 
(transformative mediation being one such approach) as a way to safely handle power-
imbalances, provide for substantive fairness, and in the process, strengthen civic society. 
49. For one framing of the various mediation models, see Ellen E. Waldman, Identifying 
the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: a Multiple Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703 
(1997). 
50. Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 20, at 18–20. 
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In the court-connected context, these characteristics of mediation, as 
a manifestation of self-determination, were also relied on in support of 
the argument that mediation can be fair in a manner that meets the 
courts’ mandate to provide for justice.51  Indeed, self-determination, 
defined broadly, was one of the central justifications for diverging from 
the formal protections and the legal norms that would be applied to the 
parties had they gone through the traditional process offered by courts.52  
The fact that parties have the ability to voluntarily and meaningfully 
participate in the process of deciding their outcome, along with having 
the sufficient knowledge needed to make such a decision,53 is meant to 
provide for a fair process, however fairness is defined.54 
While self-determination (and its varying definitions) certainly plays 
a role in shaping court-connected mediation,55 perhaps the most 
significant factor in determining how mediation is actually practiced is 
administrative efficiency.56  As noted by a number of those who attended 
the conference, administrative efficiency can be constructed narrowly to 
 
51. McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 401–05, 431–32 (2005); Welsh, Court-Connected, 
supra note 11, at 139–40. 
52. Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 
1545, 1548 (1991) (stating that “the process is said to enable the parties to exercise self-
determination and eliminate the hierarchy of dominance that characterizes the judge/litigant 
and lawyer/client relationships”); Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 20, at 93 (stating that “if 
courts and mediation advocates act now to define and protect self-determination, mediation 
may yet become a process that is qualitatively different and better than the traditional dispute 
resolution processes found within the courts”). 
53. See Reporter’s Notes, Comments made by Professor Judith McMullen at Marquette 
University Law School Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond (Sept. 
23–24, 2011) [hereinafter McMullen Comments] (discussing “What Do Stakeholders Want & 
Need—Court and Neutrals?”).  
54. The terms fairness or justice can be defined in various ways, see generally Smith & 
Martinez, supra note 7, at 128–29, and trying to provide more specific definitions is beyond 
the scope of this Report.  Generally, the discussion of fairness and justice in mediation has 
revolved around the concept of procedural justice: the ability of parties to have choice and 
voice within the process.  See Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It’s Not True: Challenging 
Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. DISP. RES. 81, 88; McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 410.  
Regardless of how “fairness” and “justice” are specifically defined, self-determination was 
meant to guarantee these. 
55. Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 20, at 33. 
56. Alfini & McCabe, supra note 24, at 174 (stating that “an emphasis on judicial 
economy, through promoting the general policy favoring settlement, may sometimes be 
inconsistent with a desire to preserve mediation’s core values such as party self-
determination”); Welsh, Mother’s Laugh, supra note 24, at 454–55. 
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encompass short-term judicial economy considerations: Does the 
intervention dispose of cases, free the court’s dockets, and preserve 
court resources?  Or, more broadly, it can be understood to include 
effectiveness in meeting the court’s role of providing access to justice, 
administering justice fairly, and providing for long-term sustainable 
resolution.57 
The broad definition does not necessarily preclude the narrow one; 
however, an exclusively narrow focus can dramatically impact the 
manner in which mediation (or any other ADR intervention) is 
implemented at the expense of the intervention’s stated goals and 
innovative value.  Indeed, how the mediation process is set up within the 
court system will likely dictate more about the quality of the 
intervention than the training and intentions of the mediator.  In the 
words of Dr. Mayer, “I think that’s exactly the relevance of how the 
system tees things up—it determines in many ways whether what we are 
engaged in is a responsible approach to dealing with cases or not.”58 
While a number of court mediation programs are not only carefully 
and thoughtfully designed and implemented, it appears that a fair 
number of such programs incorporate mediation based on narrow 
administrative considerations, due to a focus on case management and 
due to limited resources.59  The primary goal for mediation for courts 
with such a narrow focus has become more and more the efficient—
quick and cheap—settlement of cases, which is certainly an important 
goal for court ADR programs, but one that must not trump other 
important goals, such as self-determination, fairness, and justice.60  
 
57. McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 432; Louise Phipps Senft & Cynthia A. Savage, 
ADR in the Courts: Progress, Problems, and Possibilities, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 327, 339–40 
(2003); see also Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 816 (statement of Professor Susskind) 
(commenting that process should be fair, efficient, stable, and wise). 
58. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 812.  The term “neutrality,” according to Dr. 
Mayer, cannot be defined independently of the system within which the neutral, mediator, or 
other intervener operates. 
59. Alfini & McCabe, supra note 24, at 174 (stating that “an emphasis on judicial 
economy, through promoting the general policy favoring settlement, may sometimes be 
inconsistent with a desire to preserve mediation’s core values such as party self-
determination”); Welsh, Mother’s Laugh, supra note 24, at 454–55. 
60. Alfini & McCabe, supra note 24, at 205–06; Stephan Landsman, Nothing for 
Something? Denying Legal Assistance to Those Compelled to Participate in ADR Proceedings, 
37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273, 286–88 (2010); Salem, supra note 19, at 377. 
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Mediation driven primarily by narrow administrative efficiency 
considerations may include the following relatively coercive features 
found in various jurisdictions: mediation would be settlement focused,61 
mandatory,62 and relatively short;63 allow for or require the evaluation of 
the parties’ claims;64 and allow for or require the mediator to report 
parties’ good faith participation and provide a recommendation to the 
court based on the content of the mediation.65  Each one of these 
 
61. Welsh, Mother’s Laugh, supra note 24, at 438 (stating that “[r]esearch suggests that 
institutional and financial pressures have forced court-connected mediation (and mediators) 
to become predominantly evaluative, directive—and even coercive” with a focus on 
“brokering a deal”). 
62. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 823 (statement of Professor Susskind) (stating 
that “‘mandatory mediation’ is a contradiction in terms”).  A number of mediation programs, 
such as custody mediation in California, are mandatory, creating an obvious tension with the 
presumably voluntary nature of mediation.  Proponents of mandatory mediation argue that 
while entering the process is mandatory, how the parties choose to participate once attending 
mediation is completely voluntary.  See id. at 824 (statement of Professor Stulberg) (stating 
that coerced into mediation is not the same as coercion in mediation).  For a discussion and 
critique of mandatory mediation, see Landsman, supra note 60, at 286; see also Dorcas Quek, 
Mandatory Mediation: An Oxymoron? Examining the Feasibility of Implementing a Court-
Connected Mediation Program, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 479, 484–96 (2010) 
(outlining the debate over mandating parties to mediation and suggesting that the manner in 
which mediation can be mandated is best viewed along a continuum). 
63. Edwards, supra note 17, at 656; Hugh McIsaac, A Response to Peter Salem’s Article 
“The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: Beginning of the End for Mandatory 
Mediation,” 48 FAM. CT. REV. 190, 191 (2010); Salem, supra note 19, at 377 (stating that “[i]f 
mediators lack sufficient time to conduct mediation, it is simply not possible to honor, protect 
and nurture parties’ self-determination”). 
64. Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 14 
ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST LITIG., Mar. 1996, at 31, 31; Welsh, Mother’s Laugh, supra note 
24, at 454–55. 
65. For example, under Nevada foreclosure mediation, “mediators are required to 
submit a report stating if sanctionable actions occurred in the mediation and recommending 
what sanctions should be imposed . . . [and] the district court [is then required] to sanction 
mediation participants if the mediator reports ‘sanctionable’ behavior.”  See Heather Scheiwe 
Kulp, Groundbreaking Court Decision Requires Courts to Comply with Mediators, JUST CT. 
ADR (July 15, 2011), http://blog.aboutrsi.org/2011/ethics/groundbreaking-court-decision-
requires-courts-to-comply-with-mediators/ (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.086(5) and Pasillas 
v. HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281 (Nev. 2011)).  These requirements, according to one 
commentator, “put[] the mediator in the position of being the final judge, a position that 
violates party self-determination—the essential ingredient that separates mediation from 
other processes.”  Id. 
Reporting also takes place in the context of California custody mediations.  See McIsaac, 
supra note 63, at 193 (stating that “[a]lready, in California some courts contaminate the 
confidential mediation process with reporting to the court and are experiencing a loss of trust 
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features may not on its own compromise the quality of mediation being 
offered.  For example, a more directive form of mediation, such as 
evaluative mediation, may be appropriate in some cases and, in fact, 
may be precisely what the parties want.  Such features, however, can 
undermine self-determination to various degrees by undercutting 
voluntariness, neutrality, and confidentiality, and by taking away the 
ability of the parties to make their own decisions in a non-coercive 
environment.66  This is particularly so where the mediation programs 
that include such directive and relatively coercive features do not 
incorporate informed consent by the parties as a component of the 
process.  This reality raises the question whether the benefits of 
mediation as it seems to be practiced on a fairly wide scale—benefits 
defined differently based on the perspective of different stakeholders—
outweigh, or should outweigh, the potential harm to the parties and 
even the damage done to how people perceive courts as public 
institutions. 
B.  Court-Connected Mediation—Going Forward 
To justify the practice of mediation as part of the court system, 
mediation must be practiced in a manner consistent with its stated goal 
of self-determination and with the intertwined characteristics of 
neutrality, confidentiality, and voluntariness.67  As a starting point, this 
 
and accusations of bias” (citing Gary Klien, State Orders Audit of Marin Family Court, 
MARIN INDEP. J. (July 1, 2009), http://www.marinij.com/marinnews/ci_12736575?IADID)); 
see also CAL FAM. CODE § 3183 (West 2007).  Apparently, in California, neutrals who work 
in a custody ADR process that allow for reporting are no longer referred to as “mediators,” 
but rather as “Recommending Counsel,” in order to avoid “mediation bias.”  See CAL FAM. 
CODE § 3183 (West 2007); Reporter’s Notes, Comments made by Ernie Sanchez at 
Marquette University Law School Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and 
Beyond (Sept. 23–24, 2011) [hereinafter Sanchez Comments] (discussing “What Do 
Stakeholders Want & Need—Courts & Neutrals?”).  Regardless of the actual title the 
intervener receives, the ability to report can coerce parties into settling based on the 
recommendation they receive, given that the trial court will consider the mediator as 
unbiased. 
66. Salem, supra note 19, at 377–79; supra notes 62, 63 & 65. 
67. McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 431–32; Noce, Folger & Antes, supra note 41, at 
31; Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for 
Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 776–77 (1999) (arguing that 
informed consent is essential to the practice of mediation in a manner consistent with 
autonomy and self-determination); see also Timothy Hedeen, Mediation as Contact Sport? 
Issues of Fitness and Fit Arising from Georgia’s Wilson v. Wilson, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 
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will require a clearer definition of self-determination in relation to these 
characteristics and the establishment of mechanisms that will relieve the 
pressure that is put on parties to settle as well as mechanisms that might 
also encourage mediators to not over-aggressively push for settlement 
where settlement is either not appropriate or not desired by the parties.68  
What is needed most is the clear articulation of court mediation 
programs’ goals and practices that are consistent with self-determination 
and the related characteristics of neutrality, confidentiality, and 
voluntariness not only within the operation of the actual mediation 
process itself but also within the manner that mediation is set up as part 
of the larger court process.69  Courts and mediation programs would 
have to ensure that mediators adhere to such goals.70 
Conference participants consistently stated that the level and type of 
institutional support will determine how the mediator will actually 
behave as much as, if not more than, the actual intentions of the 
mediator.  While there are many others, some of the significant areas to 
be improved identified in the conference were providing for sufficient 
time in the mediation, allowing opportunities for additional sessions, 
and not pressuring the mediators to exclusively focus on achieving 
settlement at all costs.71 
 
2009, at 24, 27. 
68. McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 2, at 426–27 (“Court rules should make it clear that 
. . . mediation is expected to be a dignified process.  Further, . . . even if courts allow or 
encourage mediators to provide their assessments of parties’ cases, courts should prohibit 
mediator recommendations regarding appropriate settlements and over-aggressive 
evaluation.”); Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 20, at 78–79. 
69. Hedeen, supra note 67, at 27; Nolan-Haley, supra note 67, 778–79 (discussing the 
need for informed consent to guarantee that the manner that parties enter the mediation 
process is fair). 
70. Hedeen, supra note 67, at 27; Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 20, at 78–91.  One 
way to adhere to such a goal is to implement and require an extensive informed consent 
process.  See Nolan-Haley, supra note 67, at 779–80 (proposing “a contextualized approach to 
informed consent with a sliding-scale model of disclosures” in order to ensure that parties 
enter into the mediation process in a truly consensual manner and are treated fairly within the 
process).  For an extensive discussion of customizing mediation to meet the parties’ needs by 
including their input, which is ultimately the best form of self-determination, see Leonard L. 
Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: “The Problem” in Court-Oriented Mediation, 
15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863 (2008). 
71. For further analyses of some of the current issues facing ADR, see Bernie Mayer, 
What We Talk About When We Talk About Neutrality: A Commentary on the Susskind–
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*** 
While mediation is one ADR process that needs improvement, 
mediation, even when practiced appropriately, is not always the right 
intervention for all disputes, which may involve parties that, to different 
extents, lack the ability or desire to self-determine.  Such limitations, 
however, do not mean that ADR interveners cannot play a different and 
significant role within court ADR programs other than as mediators, as 
long as the role is well-defined and the process itself is well-designed 
and implemented to benefit the parties and be fair to them. 
Indeed, the role of the intervener may vary as long as the process of 
intervention is fair and transparent.  For Professor Susskind, regardless 
of the role of the intervener, a process has to lead to a fair (as perceived 
by the parties), efficient, stable, wise, and well-informed resolution.  
According to him, a well-designed, high-quality process will lead to such 
outcomes.72  For Dr. Mayer, the intervener has to be transparent and 
realistic about his role, which is not to ensure a good outcome, but 
rather to provide disputants with the opportunity to engage 
constructively.73  For Professor Stulberg, being impartial is preferred, but 
not necessary, as long as the process is fair and viewed as such by the 
participants.74  Indeed, as long as the intervener is perceived to be open-
minded and even-handed, parties seem to be less concerned about 
impartiality—in the sense that this term is used in the mediation 
context—of the third party.75  All the panelists emphasized that ADR 
professionals must keep in mind that the role of the intervener is to 
serve the parties, not the courts, and that any ADR process has to be 
structured in a manner that will allow the intervener to intervene 
ethically.76 
The following section of the Report, which is primarily based on 
discussions and panels that took place at the conference, will explore 
 
Stulberg Debate, 2011 Edition, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 859 (2012); and Joseph B. Stulberg, Must a 
Mediator Be Neutral?  You’d Better Believe It!, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 829 (2012). 
72. Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 816–17.  
73. See Reporter’s Notes, Comments made by Dr. Bernard Mayer at Marquette 
University Law School Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond (Sept. 
23–24, 2011) [hereinafter Mayer Comments]. 
74. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 817–18 (statements of Joseph Stulberg). 
75. Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to 
Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 820–21 & n.164 (2001). 
76. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 821–23. 
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how courts that wish to support effective ADR programs that include 
interventions other than mediation may address these similar 
challenges. 
IV.  BEYOND MEDIATION 
As noted in the second panel of the conference, ADR processes 
other than mediation that might have mediative components may be 
more appropriate to some conflicts.77  Similarly, Dr. Julie Macfarlane 
encouraged the abandonment of “the one-size fits all fallacy.”78  Indeed, 
there are situations where there is a risk that one party will use 
mediation to coerce the other into an agreement or parts of one, such as 
when particular types of domestic violence are involved or when one 
party has a significantly higher level of power that is being used in the 
mediation as leverage.  There are other situations where one or both of 
the parties lack the capacity to meaningfully participate due to mental 
illness or substance abuse.79  There are also parties that are incapable of 
making decisions on their own in mediation due to the level of conflict 
and dysfunction.80  While this level of high conflict is not found in the 
 
77. See Reporter’s Notes, Comments made by Jackie Hagerott at Marquette University 
Law School Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond (Sept. 23–24, 
2011) (discussing “What Do Stakeholders Want & Need—Court and Neutrals?”) (asking 
whether “mediative functions [can] be distributed to others in the court” and stating that 
other processes with “mediative components” may be more appropriate). 
78. See Reporter’s Notes, Comments made by Dr. Julie Macfarlane at Marquette 
University Law School Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond (Sept. 
23–24, 2011) [hereinafter Macfarlane Comments] (discussing “Contemporary Practices 
Meeting These Needs”). 
79. Indeed, many mediation programs screen for and continuously monitor capacity 
issues and are required to do so under various professional codes.  See Patrick G. Coy & 
Timothy M. Hedeen, Disabilities and Mediation Readiness in Court-Referred Cases: 
Developing Screening Criteria and Service Networks, 16 MED. Q. 113, 115–20 (1998); Hedeen, 
supra note 31, at 945–46; Judy Cohen, The ADA Mediation Guidelines: A Community 
Collaboration Moves the Field Forward, MEDIATE.COM (Jan. 2002), 
http://www.mediate.com/articles/cohen3.cfm; Sanchez Comments, supra note 65. 
80. Coy & Hedeen, supra note 79, at 118; Salem et al., supra note 14, at 750–52 
(discussing how many high-conflict families fail to benefit from mediation and therefore 
should be pre-identified and be allowed to bypass mandatory mediation and enter into more 
directive and intrusive interventions, such as parenting coordination); Cohen, supra note 76, 
at 6.  See generally Amy Holtzworth-Munroe, Connie J.A. Beck & Amy G. Applegate, The 
Mediator’s Assessment of Safety Issues and Concerns (MASIC): A Screening Interview for 
Intimate Partner Violence and Abuse Available in the Public Domain, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 646 
(2010) (discussing domestic violence and potential measures for identifying the level of 
conflict mediation parties may be facing before they enter into mediations). 
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majority of cases, it often requires the bulk of courts and their 
professionals’ attention.81  Finally, there may be parties that simply want 
a lesser level of self-determination and instead expect to be directed to a 
solution, or to be provided with information that will better help them 
reach one.82  All of these parties, for different reasons, may need an 
intervention that includes mediative functions but is nonetheless 
something other than mediation. 
In fact, while mediation is not always the best intervention for 
everybody, parties in many cases can still benefit from other effective 
and efficient ADR interventions.83  Rather than assume a “pure” self-
determination versus coercion binary, there is room for ADR processes 
with varying degrees of “convergence” between self-determination and 
directiveness.84  It follows that the role of the ADR intervener will 
change according to the levels of convergence within a given ADR 
process.  Courts that incorporate ADR should consider providing 
different types of interventions for different types of conflict and 
capacity levels.  This should be done along a continuum that starts with 
non-directive mediation and gradually moves toward a blend of 
mediative and more directive characteristics, matching interventions to 
needs.85  Such an approach will not only benefit the parties, but it will 
also be a more prudent use of courts’ scarce resources and likely 
enhance the manner in which the courts are perceived and experienced 
by the public it serves.86 
The next Part of the Report will explore the interplay between self-
determination and directiveness within two specific ADR interventions 
 
81. Salem et al., supra note 14, at 748. 
82. See Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We 
Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641, 679, 684–85 (2002) 
(explaining that when the mediator evaluates the merits of the case or suggests a settlement, 
the case is more likely to settle and that some parties and their attorneys perceived the 
evaluation as enhancing the fairness of the mediation process). 
83. Reporter’s Notes, Day 1, Panel 4, “Contemporary Practices Meeting These Needs,” 
at Marquette University Law School Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and 
Beyond (Sept. 23–24, 2011) [hereinafter Contemporary Practices]. 
84. Id.; Macfarlane Comments, supra note 78; see also JULIE MACFARLANE, THE NEW 
LAWYER: HOW SETTLEMENT IS TRANSFORMING THE PRACTICE OF LAW 20–22 (2008); 
Peter Salem, A Distinction Without Much of a Difference: Response to Steve Baron and Hugh 
McIsaac, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 201, 203 (2010) [hereinafter Salem, Response]. 
85. Salem et al., supra note 14, at 749–50; Contemporary Practices, supra note 83. 
86. Brazil, supra note 24, at 123–24. 
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that were the subject of presentations at the conference: ENE and PC.  
It will also highlight some important fairness concerns related to these 
processes.  While at the conference these interventions were discussed 
in the family context, the discussion below intends to draw out some 
principles that can be applied to a broader context of ADR. 
A.  Early Neutral Evaluation 
ENE, one of the topics presented at the conference discussed within 
the family context,87 is an example of an ADR process that was 
developed with a  view toward the core characteristics and goals of 
mediation: confidentiality, impartiality, and certain degrees of self-
determination.  ENE is transparently more directive than the classic 
approach to mediation used in the family context, which tends to be (or 
at least intends to be) on the elicitive and facilitative side.88  The ENE 
process, as practiced in Minnesota and presented at the conference, 
starts with a case management conference subsequent to a custody-
related court filing.  A team of male and female evaluators—a particular 
adaptation to the family context—explain the process to the parties and 
stress the importance of the parents’ voice within it.89  The evaluators 
then gather what they deem to be sufficient facts from the parties to 
determine what would be the best outcome for them, with a special 
consideration of the children’s needs.  The determination is then 
conveyed in the form of a recommendation to the parties.90  Following 
the recommendation, the ENE team meets with both sides to shape an 
agreement that can be tailored to meet the needs of the parties and their 
families.91  Approximately 70% of cases are reported to settle through 
the ENE process, as practiced in Minnesota.92 
 
87. For a good discussion of ENE within the family context, see Yvonne Pearson et al., 
Early Neutral Evaluations: Applications to Custody and Parenting Time Cases Program 
Development and Implementation in Hennepin County, Minnesota, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 672 
(2006). 
88. See MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE MEDIATION, 
(2000); Welsh, Mother’s Laugh, supra note 24, at 454. 
89. See Reporter’s Notes, Comments made by Jim Getz at Marquette University Law 
School Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond (Sept. 23–24, 2011) 
(discussing “Contemporary Practices Meeting These Needs”).  
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
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In comparison, under an ENE program established in the civil 
context in the Northern District of California, parties that are assigned 
to the process must attend “with the attorney who will be lead counsel 
should the case go to trial.”93  Prior to the ENE session, each side 
submits a statement to the neutral that identifies session participants, 
major disputed issues, and any discovery that would be necessary for 
meaningful settlement discussions.94  The protocol of the session itself is 
very structured: following an explanation of the program and 
procedures, each side presents an opening statement outlining their 
arguments.95  The evaluator may ask questions and probe for strengths 
and weaknesses.96  The evaluator then identifies issues in agreement and 
issues in dispute, and adjourns to a separate room to prepare a written 
evaluation.97  Before sharing the evaluation, the parties are encouraged 
to explore settlement with the help of the evaluator.98  If either party 
declines, the evaluator discloses their written assessment and again 
facilitates discussions.99  If no settlement is produced, the evaluators may 
help the parties develop an efficient approach to case management.100  
With the consent of the court, the parties may agree to a follow-up 
meeting with the evaluators.101 
The goal of ENE, whether in the family context or in a broader civil 
context, is to educate the parties by providing them with a reality 
check102 that may help them recalibrate their expectations and move 
them away from entrenched, non-compromising positions.  With this 
reality-check in place, the parties, with the help of the evaluators, are in 
a better position to come up with their own solutions and agreements.  
Although the recommendation is non-binding and confidential, the 
evaluators are relying on the informal authority of their position and 
 
93. Joshua D. Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An 
Empirical Analysis, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1490 (1994). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 1490–91. 
99. Id. at 1491. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 969 (2000). 
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expertise to encourage and direct the parties toward a solution that fits 
within the recommendation of the evaluators. 
The requirement to “make your case” to the evaluators coupled with 
the injection of the professional opinion of the evaluators tends to 
undermine self-determination in the original sense of the term.103  
However, ENE includes characteristics that provide a counter-balance 
to this somewhat diminished level of self-determination.  For one, the 
process is transparent, satisfying the requirement, as stated by Dr. 
Mayer, to provide “accurate labels of the neutral intervener’s role, 
labels that do not mislead the parties.”104  Moreover, similar to 
mandatory mediation in many jurisdictions, although the initial 
attendance may be mandatory, continued participation in ENE is 
voluntary, at least in the family context, giving the parties the option to 
opt out once the process is explained to them and at any later point in 
time.  While attending and participating in the civil ENE program 
described above appears to be mandatory, the evaluator’s assessment is 
not binding.  The civil ENE program seems to assume that the parties 
will be represented by counsel, further mitigating the threat of coercion.  
Perhaps most significantly, the assignment to ENE in the Northern 
District of California involves the participation of the parties and their 
lawyers.105  In other words, ENE, especially as practiced in Minnesota 
but also in the Northern District of California, is designed to ensure a 
meaningful process of informed consent. 
In addition to transparency and choice, the process is confidential, 
allowing for a frank and open discussion without concerns over how the 
ENE process, and particularly the recommendation itself, may impact 
the outcome of the dispute if it ends up being litigated.  Finally, the 
evaluators try to maximize the parties’ opportunities to make their own 
decisions at various stages of the process within the constraints of the 
recommendation or, as the example from the Northern District of 
California illustrates, even prior to the recommendation being made.106 
 
103. See Kovach & Love, supra note 64, at 31; Welsh, Thinning Vision, supra note 20, at 
17–18 (self-determination originally “promised disputants the opportunity to participate 
actively and directly in the process of resolving their dispute, control the substantive norms 
guiding their discussion and decision-making, create the options for settlement, and control 
the final outcome of the dispute resolution process”). 
104. Mayer Comments, supra note 73.  
105. See infra text accompanying notes 150–156. 
106. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.  A different innovative approach to 
encouraging self-determination can be found in an online negotiation tool titled “Getting 
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The relatively high level of self-determination and lowered level of 
coercion, the potential benefits derived by the parties, and the efficient 
use of court resources all justify the use of ENE within court systems.  
Some important issues to consider when exploring the inclusion of ENE 
include whether parties should be mandated to participate in the 
process; at what point of the process the parties should be allowed to opt 
out, if at all, after the initial explanation or after a good faith attempt to 
reach a resolution following the recommendation; and whether the 
recommendation of the evaluators will remain confidential and not be 
reported to the presiding judge.  Depending on the approach adopted, 
the levels of directive-ness, intrusion, and potential coercion will shift.  
Regardless, ENE may be a more appropriate ADR process for parties 
that cannot reap the benefits of non-coercive mediation as long as it is 
set up appropriately.  
B.  Parenting Coordination 
Parenting coordination (PC) is an example of an ADR intervention 
within the family context that contains directive and even potentially 
coercive features, depending on the particular manner in which it is 
practiced.  Although spreading, PC is not a very widely used court ADR 
intervention.  PC as practiced in Florida was presented at the conference 
by Linda Fieldstone and may serve as a model for other jurisdictions to 
consider.  Although featured in the family context, the most important 
feature of PC—having disputants commit to an ADR intervention for a 
period of time—might be relevant to other civil disputes, especially 
those that involve an ongoing relationship.  On a broader level, the 
conclusions from the discussion of PC in the family context can apply to 
other ADR interventions that tend to be more directive or even 
coercive. 
According to the Guidelines for Parenting Coordination, developed 
by the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts Task Force on 
Parenting Coordination, the goals of the process are “to assist high 
conflict parents to implement their parenting plan, to monitor 
 
Divorced Online” developed for the Dutch Legal Aid Board.  This tool provides the 
divorcing parties with the relevant information, legal and otherwise, that allows them to 
evaluate their cases better on their own as well as facilitates communication between the 
parties.  See generally Martin Gramatikov & Laura Klaming, Getting Divorced Online: 
Procedural and Outcome Justice in Online Divorce Mediation (TISCO Working Paper Series 
on Civil Law and Conflict Resolution Systems, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1752903. 
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compliance with the details of the plan, to resolve conflicts regarding 
their children and the parenting plan in a timely manner, and to protect 
and sustain safe, healthy and meaningful parent–child relationships.”107  
Under PC, the coordinator provides the parties with a psycho-
educational framework, helps the parties develop negotiating skills, and 
works to resolve parenting-related disputes.108  Where the parties cannot 
reach a consensual agreement on their own, the parenting coordinator 
can make enforceable recommendations.109 
PC is particularly useful for high-conflict parenting disputes where 
the parents are not able to resolve their child-related disputes on their 
own and constantly revert to relying on the courts to intervene.110  For 
these reasons, this intervention can also benefit courts.111  Some of the 
characteristics of PC, such as educating the parties with the hope that 
they themselves will change their destructive dynamic and, in the 
process, empowering them to make their own decisions, are consistent 
with the goal of self-determination.112  Some of the other characteristics 
of PC, on the other hand, tend to be coercive: there are no guarantees of 
confidentiality, and the coordinator can, depending on the court order, 
tell the parties what they must do in the event they cannot agree 
themselves.113  Indeed, PC can potentially put the intervener in the 
position of an arbitrator,114 which is as coercive and as binding as 
litigation but without the procedural and substantive fairness guarantees 
 
107. Assoc. of Family and Conciliation Courts (AFCC) Task Force on Parenting 
Coordination, Guidelines for Parenting Coordination, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 164, 165 (2006). 
108. See Reporter’s Notes, Comments made by Linda Fieldstone at Marquette 
University Law School Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond (Sept. 
23–24, 2011) [hereinafter Fieldstone Comments] (discussing “Contemporary Practices 
Meeting These Needs”).  
109. Id.  
110. Id.; Wilma J. Henry et al., Parenting Coordination and Court Relitigation: A Case 
Study, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 682, 694 (2009). 
111. Henry et al., supra note 110, at 694; Fieldstone Comments, supra note 108. 
112. Fieldstone Comments, supra note 108. 
113. See Sherrill W. Hayes, “More of a Street Cop than a Detective”: An Analysis of the 
Roles and Functions of Parenting Coordinators in North Carolina, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 698, 703, 
706–07 (2010). 
114. Id. at 707 (“[T]he results seem to align PC more with a ‘med-arb’ rather than an 
‘arb-med’ hybrid . . . .” (citing Arnold Shienvold, Hybrid Processes, in DIVORCE AND 
FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND APPLICATIONS 112, 112–26 (Jay Folberg 
et al. eds., 2004))). 
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found in the traditional court process.115  In sum, the PC process itself 
actually mirrors a dispute resolution continuum, beginning with 
education on one end of the spectrum and ending with decisions (the 
scope of which are usually limited by the court order) that are not made 
by the parties. 
The primary justification for including PC and its relatively coercive 
potential is that parties at times lack the capacity to resolve their issues 
in a less coercive process and, therefore, need more assistance and 
direction.  Indeed, by the time they are involved with PC, the parties 
have often demonstrated this lack of capacity, which may justify being 
ordered by the court to such a process.  In fact, the most coercive 
intervention—litigation—has not worked for these parties as reflected 
by their ongoing relitigation efforts.  While the potential lessening of 
self-determination within PC may be appropriate for parties who, at 
least at times, do not seem to have the capacity to make decisions on 
their own, the reduced fairness guarantees must also be addressed, 
particularly in light of the fact that a non-judicial professional is put in a 
position of authority that can impact fundamental rights of parties. 
Any jurisdiction that considers implementing PC as part of its family 
ADR program must provide fairness safeguards.  One approach would 
be to make PC voluntary, allowing parties to decide whether they will 
sign up for the process after being fully informed of the PC process and 
the consequences of entering into it.  Once they do sign up, the 
parenting coordinator’s recommendation could be binding.  Including a 
process for obtaining meaningful informed consent will provide for 
meaningful fairness guarantees.  Another approach would be to allow 
for meaningful judicial review of the coordinator’s recommendation, 
similar to the review conducted of magistrates’ or bankruptcy judges’ 
recommendations and the judicial review of party-negotiated marital 
termination agreements.  This approach would likely undermine one of 
the important benefits of PC, which is to avoid relitigation of issues.  
Presumably, however, the parties would only challenge the 
coordinator’s decision in extreme cases of disagreement; most of the 
 
115. Welsh, Court-Connected, supra note 11, at 130–32 (listing criticisms of arbitration).  
Indeed, evidence from unpublished in-depth client interviews indicates that some parties who 
participated in one version of PC felt that the coordinator had unexpected “unchecked 
power.”  Telephone Interview with Professor Bobbi McAdoo, Professor of Law, Hamline 
Univ. School of Law (Feb. 16, 2012). 
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issues will be resolved informally without such challenges.   It should be 
noted, however, that one significant limitation of such judicial review is 
that the judge is most likely to accept and not overturn the PC 
intervener’s judgment.   Nonetheless, the potential review of the PC 
intervener’s decision should provide a check on their power.  
However approached, simply mandating parties to PC without 
careful consideration of the impact on fairness and justice is not 
appropriate. 
C.  Beyond ENE and PC: Implications to Other ADR Interventions 
PC and ENE, as well as other interventions, appear to have 
something in common: they try to meld opportunities for self-
determination, such as education and the provision of information, with 
other process components that tend to be more directive, such as 
recommendations and reporting, that combined may help to influence 
the parties’ decisions and help them to arrive at an agreement that is 
best for them.  In other words, not only should the various ADR 
processes be placed along a continuum with different degrees of self-
determination and directiveness, such a continuum often exists within 
the ADR processes themselves.  A shift from viewing ADR processes 
within a narrow self-determination versus directiveness–coercion binary 
and toward a view of the processes (both in comparison to others and 
internally) along a continuum should provide even more room for 
innovation.116  
The level of self-determination allotted to the parties within an 
ADR process should ideally correlate with the capacity of the parties to 
self-determine (as long as the parties in fact want to do so); the more 
capacity the parties have, the more opportunities for self-determination 
the ADR intervention should allow for.  Conversely, the more directive 
or coercive an intervention is, the larger the concern over fairness and 
justice must be, as a direct result of the diminished opportunities to self-
determine either within the process itself or when entering into the 
process to begin with.  Where concerns of fairness are heightened, 
 
116. There are also risks inherent to over-expanding ADR options, stemming from a 
less than clearly drawn line between “‘adjudicative’ and ‘consensual’ categories” and a lack of 
understanding of the various processes.  Nancy A. Welsh, Integrating “Alternative” Dispute 
Resolution into Bankruptcy: As Simple (and Pure) as Motherhood and Apple Pie?, 11 NEV. 
L.J. 397, 398–99 (2011). 
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alternative fairness safeguards must be incorporated within the 
intervention. 
Broadly speaking, there are three ways to incorporate such 
safeguards: by establishing fairness through the design and 
characteristics of the process itself and through the framing of the role 
of the intervener, as can be seen in the above discussion of ENE; by 
providing for a truly non-coercive, fully informed, and consensual opt-in 
to a more coercive intervention, such as the approach suggested above 
in the context of the PC discussion and incorporated into the design of 
ENE in Minnesota;117 or by guaranteeing meaningful court oversight 
over the non-judicial, potentially coercive decision, the second approach 
discussed above under PC. 
Assuming that a jurisdiction decides to adopt interventions other 
than mediation, the question then becomes how to channel parties to 
the appropriate intervention.  This question was the subject of one of 
the presentations at the conference118 and will be explored in the next 
Part within the context of tiered and triage ADR systems. 
V.  MULTI-OPTIONAL ADR SYSTEMS: THE TIERED AND TRIAGE 
MODELS 
If interventions other than mediation—ENE, PC, or any other—are 
made part of an ADR system, the inquiry then turns to the method of 
referring parties to the appropriate intervention: who should decide 
what type of intervention parties will receive119 and at what point of the 
 
117. There is, however, some evidence that parties do not always understand the type of 
process they enter into, even when their participation would be considered voluntary.  For 
example, when interviewing an individual who participated in an ADR intervention in 
Minnesota in the family context, the interviewee discussed the result in a process she called 
“mediation” that allowed the neutral to change a judicially approved parenting arrangement 
without her consent.  Whatever ADR process this was, it clearly was not mediation; but the 
party did not understand what ADR process she had opted into.  McAdoo Interview, supra 
note 115.  One response to such confusion can be found in the approach taken in Ohio, where 
the intake officer has a pool of interveners to educate and protect the public from confusion 
over the various roles ADR interveners can play.  Reporter’s Notes, Comments made by 
Jackie Hagaret at Marquette University Law School Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: 
Mediation and Beyond (Sept. 23–24, 2011) (discussing “What do Stakeholders Want & 
Need—Court and Neutrals?”). 
118. See Reporter’s Notes, Comments made by Professor Andrew Schepard at 
Marquette University Law School Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and 
Beyond (Sept. 23–24, 2011) (discussing “Contemporary Practices Meeting These Needs”).  
119. Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 823.   
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process should this decision be made?  And in the event the decision is 
taken out of the hands of the parties themselves, what will be the 
process for assigning parties to interventions?  Mapped onto these 
questions is the important issue of resource allocation: the effectiveness 
of an intervention, along with the number of families channeled to a 
particular intervention, should impact the manner in which funds are 
allocated to the various forms of intervention within the system. 
These questions will be looked at by comparing a tiered approach 
(where the parties usually start with educational programs, then go to 
mediation, and progress to more directive and potentially intrusive 
interventions) to the innovative triage approach (where parties are 
channeled to what is deemed to be the appropriate intervention out of a 
variety of interventions) that was presented at the conference. 
Both tiered and triage—multi-optional ADR programs—provide a 
menu of interventions in addition to mediation and tend to have a 
relatively robust level of institutional support.120  Under one example of 
a tiered system in the family context, the parties are first provided with a 
divorce education program and then sent to mandatory mediation.121  If 
mediation does not result in a settlement, then the parties are escalated 
to the next intervention.122  The interventions progress from the least 
intrusive and most supportive of self-determination—mediation—to 
gradually more intensive and directive options123 that tend to lessen 
parties’ levels of self-determination. 
As under a tiered system, triaging124 (or differentiated case 
management125) consists of ADR interventions with varying levels of 
 
120. Connecticut, where a triage approach is used, is considered an innovator and leader 
in dispute resolution processes and in addressing the complex challenges of families involved 
in parenting disputes.  Salem et al., supra note 14, at 748.  In California, where the tiered 
approach is used, a unified family court system has been in place for many years.  See 
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, UNIFIED COURTS FOR 
FAMILIES PROGRAM: MENTOR COURT PROJECT 8–10 (2007), available at 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/UCFEDITFinal-online.pdf.  The Northern District of 
California also has a sophisticated triage approach in the civil litigation context.  Brazil, supra 
note 24, at 111. 
121. McIsaac, supra note 63, at 192; Salem et al., supra note 14, at 750–51. 
122. McIsaac, supra note 63, at 192. 
123. See Salem et al., supra note 14, at 750; Salem, supra note 19, at 371–73, 745. 
124. See Salem, supra note 19, at 371 (“In recent years, a handful of family court service 
agencies, including those in Connecticut, Arizona and British Columbia, have begun to 
explore variations of triage, or differentiated case management, as an alternative service 
delivery model.  Triage proponents suggest a departure from the common practice of 
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self-determination opportunities and varying levels of directiveness, 
such as providing information, pressuring to settle, predicting court 
outcomes, and some or all of the above.  The significant addition under 
the triage approach is the inclusion of a screening process that is meant 
to channel the parties to the more appropriate intervention based on the 
needs and capacities of the parties.126  In Connecticut, as one example of 
a triage approach in the family context, court counselors may 
recommend that parties attend mediation, a confidential conflict 
resolution conference, an issue-focused evaluation, or a comprehensive 
evaluation, a determination made based on the information collected in 
this initial intake interview.127  Parties that do not agree with a service 
recommendation may contest it, but they rarely do.128 
A.  Balancing Considerations of Administrative Efficiency and Party 
Benefits 
The tiered and triage approaches in the family context do not differ 
(at least in theory) over the need to screen for domestic violence or for 
cases where one or both of the parties lack the necessary capacity due to 
high levels of substance abuse or mental illness.129  The real distinction 
between the two approaches relates to the method of referring parties to 
particular ADR interventions at the beginning of their involvement with 
the court.  Specifically, the two systems differ in how they approach 
high-conflict parties that are deemed to have a diminished capacity to 
work together in a voluntary setting but have no other prohibitive 
capacity limitations.  Under the tiered approach, such parties will be 
mandated to mediation to maximize their opportunity to self-determine 
 
referring all parents to mediation.”). 
125. ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 113–17 (2004). 
126. In Connecticut, for example, the triage process starts with a confidential screening 
interview.  “The Family Civil Intake Screen contains questions in six domains: (1) General 
Information; (2) Level of Conflict; (3) Ability to Cooperate and Communicate; (4) 
Complexity of Issues; (5) Level of Dangerousness; and (6) Disparity of Facts/Need for 
Corroborating Information.”  Salem et al., supra note 14, at 758.  
127. “No single question is intended to determine specific services; however, there are 
key questions about violence and safety that may trigger specific interventions.”  Salem et al., 
supra note 14, at 758.  
128. Salem, supra note 19, at 380. 
129. See Salem, Response, supra note 84, at 202 (stating that “[s]creening for concerns 
related to domestic violence and other safety-related issues has been standard operating 
procedure for may court mediation programs for years”). 
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prior to being assigned to other, more “directive and intrusive” ADR 
interventions.130  Under a triage approach, some of these cases will be 
diverted from mandatory mediation through a screening process.131 
Underlying these two different approaches is a debate over how to 
balance between the effective use of court resources and the relative 
benefit to the parties.  Proponents of the triage approach argue that 
diverting parties who are less likely to benefit from mediation will free 
up resources for higher quality mediation132 and other interventions that 
are deemed to be more effective for particular parties and 
circumstances.133  They also argue that mandating parties to mediation in 
inappropriate cases may harm the parties due to the impact on the 
parties’ resources and due to the possibility that a failed intervention 
may actually escalate the dispute between the parties.134 
Proponents of mandatory mediation within a tiered system counter 
that there is no effective way to properly predetermine whether 
mediation can be helpful to high-conflict parties.135  They further argue 
that many high-conflict parties that initially resist mediation end up 
tremendously benefiting from maximizing their opportunity to self-
determine, which justifies mandating all appropriate high-conflict cases 
to mediation.136  Indeed, not sending all parties to mediation would 
result in inappropriately excluding at least some parties from mediation 
and unduly minimizing their opportunities for self-determination.137  
Therefore, according to proponents of the tiered approach, there is 
insufficient justification for diverting parties and funds from mediation 
to other processes, and in fact the opposite may be true. 
The difference between the two approaches seems to boil down to 
whether to risk erring on the side of over- or under-inclusion.  Under 
the triage approach, there is a potential for under-including parties in 
mediation.  Proponents of this approach are willing to take this risk, 
arguing that a principled and sound method for allocating parties to the 
 
130. Salem et al., supra note 14, at 757–60. 
131. Salem, supra note 19, at 380. 
132. See infra Part V.B–.C.  
133. See infra Part V.B–.C. 
134. Salem et al., supra note 14, at 750 (stating that parties “often becom[e] increasingly 
polarized through repeated failed attempts to resolve their disputes”).  
135. McIsaac, supra note 63, at 193; Salem, supra note 19, at 372. 
136. McIsaac, supra note 63, at 190–93. 
137. See supra note 62 for a brief discussion of mandatory mediation.  
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appropriate intervention can be designed to diminish the level of under-
inclusion.  While the risk of under-inclusion is diminished in this 
manner, the payoff is significant and worthwhile: screening would allow 
for a better allocation of the resources saved toward other interventions 
and mediation improvements, which would enhance the system as a 
whole.138  Under the tiered approach, on the other hand, there is the 
potential, almost the certainty, of offering mediation to parties that 
cannot benefit from it, but proponents of the tiered approach believe 
that it is difficult to predetermine who can or cannot benefit from 
mediation.139  They place a higher value on maximizing opportunities of 
self-determination at the risk of over-inclusion.140  They also doubt that 
it is possible to appropriately prescribe the right intervention under the 
triage approach, arguing that the risk of under-inclusion is higher than 
suggested by triage proponents.141 
B.  Considerations of Fairness in the Assignment Process 
Striking the right balance between the benefits derived by the parties 
and the efficient use of scarce funds is one piece of the puzzle, while 
fairness to the parties is the other.  Within an ADR system there are 
three layers where coercion can take place.  The first is in the design of 
the intervention itself, which will dictate whether the intervention will 
tend to be directive or even potentially coercive (as discussed above in 
the context of mediation, ENE, and PC).142  The second is the manner in 
which the intervention is actually practiced and the related procedural 
justice implications, regardless of the original intent behind the design of 
the process (as discussed above in the context of mediation).143  The 
third, addressed below, is the manner in which parties are assigned to a 
process.  As to the last, how can this important decision be made in a 
manner that takes into account fairness considerations?  More 
specifically, who should determine where the parties end up: a judge, 
court administrator, service provider, or perhaps the parties themselves? 
 
138. Salem, Response, supra note 84, at 202. 
139. See McIsaac, supra note 63, at 193 (stating that “[t]riage places a most difficult 
burden upon the triage worker to predict the future whether or not the family can successfully 
mediate” and in the difficult position of “predicting the future”). 
140. Id. at 192–93. 
141. See McIsaac, supra note 63, at 193. 
142. See supra Parts III.A & IV.A–.B. 
143. See supra Part III.A. 
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In the tiered system, parties that do not settle through mandatory 
mediation appear before a judge who has the discretion to mandate that 
the parties engage in a different, potentially coercive ADR process.  The 
fact that a judge is the one mandating the parties to a different process 
falls in line with how the judge’s authority to manage cases is currently 
understood; however, this type of authority raises some broad concerns 
that parties will be mandated to surrogate judges that are not bound by 
the same standards and considerations of a judge assigned to their role 
through a democratic process.144 
In the family triage system, the fairness concerns in the manner of 
assignment focus on the intake screening process.  Presumably, a non-
judicial professional will have at the very least the informal power to 
direct parties to a process that is non-voluntary and potentially 
coercive.145  The assignment to such a process by a non-judicial 
professional is significant in light of the fact that it may directly impact 
the determination of the parties’ legal rights.146 
One approach to resolving this problem is the one adopted by 
proponents of the family triage program in Connecticut.147  The 
assignment method in Connecticut provides for a transparent, objective, 
and vetted process for screening that can include the parties’ own input 
and that also provides for a meaningful opportunity to challenge the 
ADR assignment.148  However, there is one significant limitation to this 
approach: while there is a right to appeal the screener’s 
recommendation,149 it is safe to presume that mere dissatisfaction with 
being assigned to an intervention process due to its relatively coercive 
 
144. Welsh, Court-Connected, supra note 11, at 122–24, 134–35, 141–43. 
145. McIsaac, supra note 63, at 193. 
146. Id. (stating that triage function will not be subject to review and therefore will be 
part of a process that “Laura Nader termed a ‘micro-legal process’ without safeguards”) 
147. Salem, supra note 19, at 380 (stating that “[i]n Connecticut, the screening interview 
is confidential, after which family court counselors recommend that parties participate in 
mediation, confidential conflict resolution conference, an issue-focused evaluation or 
comprehensive evaluation.  Parties who do not agree with a recommendation may contest it 
to the court; in practice, however, agency administrators report virtually universal acceptance 
of the counselor service recommendations”). 
148. Id. at 383 (stating that “[a]dmittedly, a major flaw exists in the case for replacing 
tiered services models with a triage system: it is predicated on accurate, easy to administer, 
replicable methods of predicting the most appropriate service for each family.  At this time no 
such method exists, but there is work that points us in the right direction”). 
149. Id. at 380.  
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nature will not provide sufficient grounds for appeal.  In other words, 
the full consent of the parties does not appear to be a prerequisite for 
assignment. 
The simplest solution to the fairness dilemmas raised under either 
the tiered or triage approaches discussed so far would be to allow the 
parties themselves to select the process they want, after they fully 
understand the different options.150  Such an approach will likely result 
in at least some parties not selecting the process that would benefit them 
most (as would be determined by a third party who can presumably do 
so effectively) or selecting a less effective process, resulting in a waste of 
scarce public funds.  It also may result in parties trying to “game the 
system” by opting for a process that they believe will most benefit them, 
and it would require a tie-breaker for times when parties select different 
processes.  Finally, it diminishes the authority of the court to manage 
cases and does not take into account the lessened level of autonomy of 
those who put themselves under the authority of the court by seeking 
the court’s intervention.  In short, while making the assignment 
voluntary may provide robust fairness guarantees, it will also potentially 
undermine the effectiveness of the ADR program and the authority of 
the court.  Nonetheless, this is an approach that must be considered 
because of its heightened guarantees of fairness and because it is 
consistent with the idea that plaintiffs get to choose to go to court and, 
therefore, should be allowed to opt out of the traditional court setting 
rather than being forced to do so. 
A different approach for assignment found in the ADR program 
established in the Northern District of California provides an interesting 
variation to the previous two approaches so far discussed.  In the 
Northern District of California’s civil ADR program, the ADR system 
consists of problem-solving mediation, ENE, non-binding arbitration, 
and judicially hosted settlement conferences.151  When designing the 
ADR system, the court explicitly addressed the important questions of 
the role of the parties and counsel in deciding whether to use ADR and 
 
150. Reporter’s Notes, Comments made by Professor John Lande at Marquette 
University Law School Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond (Sept. 
23–24, 2011) (discussing “Core Values of Dispute Resolution—Is Neutrality Necessary?”); 
Nolan-Haley, supra note 67, at 778–79 (discussing the need for informed consent to guarantee 
fairness). 
151. Smith & Martinez, supra note 7, at 146 (citing Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR), U.S. DIST. CT. N. DIST. OF CAL., http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/adr (last visited Jan. 
22, 2012)). 
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in selecting an ADR process, and the degree the court should encourage 
or coerce parties into an ADR process in the event they cannot select a 
process on their own.152  In response to these questions, a multi-step 
assignment process was conceived.  The process first requires that the 
attorneys educate their clients about the ADR options and that the 
attorneys meet and confer with the other side.153  The parties may 
customize any of the processes they select.154  If this selection process 
fails, the parties are required to participate in an “ADR conference” 
with the court’s ADR staff.  If the parties still cannot agree on a process, 
the ADR administrator either recommends a process to the judge or 
recommends that the parties do not engage in ADR.  The goals of this 
assignment process are to engage the conflict stakeholders in the process 
of determining the appropriate intervention for them.155  While 
ultimately the assignment decision may be taken out of the hands of the 
parties and their lawyers, this is done as a last step, which is more “just” 
both procedurally and substantively.156 
The approach assumed in the Northern District of California can be 
labeled as a triage approach: ultimately, a court employee will make a 
recommendation to the court, which in turn has the authority to bind 
the parties to a particular process.  However, the process of assignment 
itself is, in fact, tiered: the manner of assignment to the ADR process 
progresses from the least coercive approach, allowing the parties to 
make their own process choice, to a more coercive one, where the court, 
pursuant to a recommendation made by a court administrator, makes 
the decision for the parties.  While the tiered assignment approach is 
 
152. Smith & Martinez, supra note 7, at 147.  See generally N. DIST. OF CAL., DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 15 (2005), available at 
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/overview (follow “Dispute Resolution Procedures” hyperlink).  
153. Smith & Martinez, supra note 7, at 147. 
154. See Riskin & Welsh, supra note 70, at 863, 903 (citing N. DIST. OF CAL., supra note 
152, at 15). 
155. N. DIST. CAL., supra note 152, at 129. 
156. Indeed, professors Nancy Welsh and Andrea Schneider suggest in a forthcoming 
article currently titled Of Fireworks and Flames: Considering the Lessons of Dispute System 
Design and Procedural Justice in Using Mediation to Resolve Disputes in Investor–State 
Relations, PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. (forthcoming 2012), that at least in the context of 
mediation, parties are more likely to perceive the decision to order the use of mediation to be 
more procedurally just if they received the opportunity for voice, consideration, and even-
handed and dignified treatment during the decision-making process that led to being 
mandated to mediation.  See E-mail from Professor Nancy A. Welsh, Penn. State Law School, 
to author (Feb. 22, 2012, 20:57 EST). 
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superior to an assignment process that takes the decision completely out 
of the hands of the stakeholders, it is also potentially resource intensive 
and will require adaptation to other contexts such as the family one, 
where most parties are not represented.  Nonetheless, it offers a 
valuable lesson about how one might approach the design of an 
assignment process itself: it can be designed to include stages along a 
continuum, where the parties initially might get the opportunity to self-
determine what process to participate in and gradually move onto more 
coercive methods of assignment. 
C.  The Importance and Limitations of Empirical Research 
One important way to determine whether one intervention or ADR 
system is preferred over others is through empirical research.  Data 
derived from such research can serve to justify allocating resources to 
particular interventions or ADR systems—tiered, triage, or any other 
variant—as a whole. 
There are a number of challenges to conducting such research.  To 
obtain the best comparative results, assignment to interventions would 
have to be random and the impact of interventions would have to be 
measured over time.  Such random assignment has the potential of 
harming some of the families that end up with the less effective or 
suitable intervention for them.  It should therefore come as no surprise 
that, from a practical standpoint, it is difficult, but not impossible, to get 
courts to agree to implement random assignment experiments.157  An 
alternative method of obtaining good comparative results would be to 
demonstrate that the characteristics of individuals in different ADR 
processes are the same. 
An additional challenge is that empirical research requires that 
funds be diverted toward pilot programs and away from existing 
programs, which again raises questions of priorities in resource 
allocation.  This concern is somewhat tempered within programs where 
staff are already made responsible for conducting empirical research.  
An additional challenge is that jurisdictions, and even courts within the 
 
157. For two such widely discussed studies, see WAYNE KOBBERVIG, MN. JUDICIAL 
CTR., MEDIATION OF CIVIL CASES IN HENNEPIN COUNTY: AN EVALUATION (1991); Robert 
E. Emery et al., Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Custody, Contact, and Coparenting 
12 Years After Initial Dispute Resolution, 69 J. CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 323 
(2001). 
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same jurisdiction, may vary widely in a number of dimensions that may 
impact the applicability of the results to other jurisdictions. 
The design of the research itself is a separate and serious issue 
because research requires an agreement about which measures should 
matter.  To name a few potential areas of measurement: self-
determinism, efficient resource use, authority of the court, resulting 
agreement rates, party satisfaction, procedural justice perceptions, 
which process leads to more efficient use of court time, and any mix of 
the above.  The data relevant to any of these measurements is difficult 
to obtain; what is to be measured is even more difficult for multiple 
stakeholders to agree upon. 
 While implementing empirical research can be challenging, more 
empirical research is essential, as well as other research approaches.  
Such research can have more modest goals of measuring the short-term 
impact of interventions, as well as the perception of the parties about 
whether they were well-served by a particular intervention.158  
Additionally, focus groups, interviews, and other kinds of qualitative 
research should also be considered for gathering information about 
what works and why.  The different approaches to research—empirical 
and otherwise—can provide jurisdictions that seek to make immediate 
or long-term reforms with guidance regarding the types of ADR 
modules that work best. 
*** 
So far, this Report has focused on providing a framework for 
discussing the goals of court ADR systems.  This discussion largely 
mirrors the first day of the conference.  The next Part of the Report will 
focus on some of the considerations that go into the actual design and 
implementation process of ADR systems, which was primarily focused 
on during the second day of the conference. 
The conference attendants were cognizant of the fact that 
jurisdictions have various cultures (both legal and otherwise), various 
institutional needs and constraints, and are at various stages of evolution 
or, sadly, devolution.  The assumption therefore was that there cannot 
be a uniformly ideal ADR program, nor can there be a uniform process 
for designing and implementing such a system.  Nonetheless, there were 
common elements that the conference attendees highlighted that will be 
 
158. See, e.g., McAdoo, Welsh & Wissler, supra note 38, at 8. 
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useful to jurisdictions evaluating their specific programs and considering 
reform. 
The next Part of the Report will outline some practical steps to 
promote, design, implement, and reform ADR programs.159  The 
following section is based almost entirely on what the conference 
participants spoke about as recorded within notes taken by the 
conference reporters, transcripts of the first day of the conference, and 
short, informal reports drafted by the five groups convened during the 
second day of the conference. 
VI.  THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ADR SYSTEMS 
A number of jurisdictions have successfully implemented ADR 
programs and should be looked to as models as a whole or for specific 
strategies that worked.160  The first required step is to initiate the process 
for reforming or implementing an ADR program.  The second is the 
process of reform or design itself.  The last is ensuring the longevity of 
the ADR program. 
A.  Setting the Stage for ADR 
Before approaching the question of how to either design an 
appropriate ADR program or reform an existing one161 (initiatives that 
share common characteristics but also diverge in others), support for 
such an agenda must be in place.  Without this needed support, there 
will be no political will or there will not be the resources needed for a 
successful design and implementation of an ADR program. 
 
159. The following are some useful resources for those interested in reading more about 
the process of designing an ADR system: John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods 
to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. 
REV. 69 (2002) (discussing Dispute System Design (DSD)); Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, 
Court-Connected General Civil ADR Programs: Aiming for Institutionalization, Efficient 
Resolution, and the Experience of Justice, in ADR HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 1 (Donna 
Stienstra & Susan M. Yates eds., 2004) [hereinafter McAdoo & Welsh, Aiming]; McAdoo, 
Welsh & Wissler, supra note 38 (discussing design of mediation); Smith & Martinez, supra 
note 7. 
160. Some of these jurisdictions include: California, Connecticut, Florida, Ohio, 
Minnesota, Maryland, New York, British Columbia, and Arizona.  See SHEILA M. 
GUTTERMAN ET AL., COLLABORATIVE LAW: A NEW MODEL FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7 
n.18 (2004). 
161. At this point, most systems are not designed from scratch and operate within an 
existing framework.   Smith & Martinez, supra note 7, at 125.  
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Such support should come from the broadest range of sources 
possible: regular citizens who use the system; grassroots, community 
leaders, preferably with political clout; organized networks within the 
bar, such as legal-services lawyers, and other professional associations, 
such as chambers of commerce, ADR associations, and consumer and 
family advocacy groups; court administrators; legislators; and perhaps 
most importantly, knowledgeable, energetic, politically savvy, and 
passionate judges.  It is most crucial to identify an individual or 
individuals within the court system, who can champion ADR and are 
willing to function as a repository for data and promotion efforts.162 
Some important tools for gaining such support are lobbying, 
outreach, education, and training.  Particular attention has to be placed 
on the bench and bar.  Without the appropriate “buy-in” from lawyers 
and judges, the ADR processes will likely lose their distinction from the 
traditional adversarial system, and in fact simply blend into the 
adversarial system that ADR was meant to be the alternative to.163  One 
approach suggested in the conference was offering “value-changing” 
training opportunities that are attractive to judges and lawyers; these 
individuals can impact attitudes within the bench and the bar in a 
manner that may have broad institutional implications.164  It is also 
important to include informal relationship-building efforts, such as 
going to lunch, developing friendships, and more generally, partaking in 
real conversations with leaders of the various stakeholding groups.  
Creating documents that contain clear budget rationales that draw on 
research and evaluation and summarize data to make the case for ADR 
can also significantly help.  Such materials cannot focus solely on narrow 
judicial economy considerations, otherwise ADR will be adopted for 
these reasons and no others; the materials should be used to educate 
stakeholders about the broader goals and benefits derived from these 
 
162. Reporter’s Notes, Think Tank Four at Marquette University Law School 
Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond (Sept. 24, 2011) [hereinafter 
Think Tank Four]. 
163. Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 807–08 (quoting WALDMAN, supra note 25, at 
117–18) (stating that currently, the biggest critique of mediation, the most prominent form of 
ADR, is that it is becoming more and more like the adjudicative process it was meant to be an 
alternative to); see also Welsh, Court-Connected, supra note 11, at 137–40; Welsh, Thinning 
Vision, supra note 20, at 25–26.  For an illustration of shifts in institutional attitudes toward a 
broader understanding, appreciation, and implementation of ADR, see Brazil, supra note 24, 
at 110–14.  
164. Think Tank Four, supra note 162. 
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goals, not only to parties but also to lawyers, judges, and even to society 
as a whole.  There are a number of materials already in place that can be 
relied on for such purposes.165   
B.  Who Should Convene the Process? 
To initiate the actual process of designing or reforming an ADR 
program, someone or some institution has to assume responsibility for 
the deliberative process and for identifying and convening 
stakeholders.166  One effective convener might be a sympathetic judge 
with sufficient clout.  Some examples of successful “Judge as Convener” 
scenarios can be found in the Florida, Maryland, and New York 
processes.  In Maryland, the Honorable Robert M. Bell, Chief Judge of 
the Maryland Court of Appeals, created the Maryland ADR 
Commission in 1998, charging it with “advancing the appropriate use of 
mediation and other innovative conflict resolution processes throughout 
Maryland’s courts.”167  ADR Florida, another example of a long-
standing and robust program, received widespread support from the 
judiciary.168  In New York, Chief Judge Judith Kaye pushed for and 
achieved the reform of the family court system in general, which 
included a significant ADR component.169 
 
165. See Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, The ABCs of ADR: Making ADR Work in 
Your Court System, JUDGES J., Winter 1998, at 11; McAdoo & Welsh, Aiming, supra note 
159. 
166. Reporter’s Notes, Think Tank One at Marquette University Law School 
Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond (Sept. 24, 2011) (discussing 
the design of a process to develop, reform or enhance services in family disputes). 
167. See MACRO’s History, MD. AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION OFFICE (MACRO), 
MD. COURTS.GOV, http://www.courts.state.md.us/macro/history.html (last visited Apr. 4, 
2012) [hereinafter MACRO]. 
168. Sharon Press, Building and Maintaining a Statewide Mediation Program: A View 
from the Field, 81 KY. L.J. 1029, 1042–46 (1993). 
169. Often general court reform in the family arena, such as establishment of a Unified 
Family Court, also entails significant ADR reform, as was the case in New York.  For a 
comprehensive description of the New York reform initiative that included the 
implementation of ADR led by Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye, see Judith S. Kaye & Jonathan 
Lippman, New York State Unified Court System: Family Justice Program, 36 FAM. & 
CONCILIATION COURTS REV. 144, 144 (1998) (describing a “comprehensive, forward-looking 
strategy to address the family justice issues of today and tomorrow”).  
17 - BOYARIN-11 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2012  10:41 PM 
1032 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:993 
C.  Initial Goal-Setting 
The “designer of the system has the power to define the goals of that 
system” and set the priorities.170  As noted above in detail, there is often 
a “significant tension” between “the goals of efficiency and fairness or 
justice.”171  Clear objectives for the process that take this tension into 
account must be identified and defined: what types of conflicts the 
system seeks to address; what goals the system as a whole intends to 
accomplish; and what goals each intervention within the system intends 
to accomplish.172  The initial goals may be framed by the convener in 
consultation with ADR system design experts.173  However, these goals 
cannot be rigid because they may, and in fact should, shift once the 
voices of the various stakeholders are included, which is a critical part of 
the deliberative process itself.174  Alternatively, the goals can be set quite 
broadly (i.e., to examine the state of ADR and reform it) and the 
convening process itself can set out to define the specific goals of the 
process.175 
D.  Identifying the Stakeholders 
The next crucial step is to figure out an inclusive way for deciding 
who should be part of the discussion that ultimately will shape the ADR 
system.176  Identifying and inviting the appropriate stakeholders requires 
a separate, thoughtful process.  Within the process of identifying the 
stakeholders, it is important to keep in mind that while there are 
multiple stakeholders, they do not have equal stakes.177  The stakes are 
 
170. Smith & Martinez, supra note 7, at 130 (footnote omitted). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 129–30.  
173. This is the process similar to the one that took place in Connecticut when it 
reformed its family ADR program to a triage approach.  Salem et al., supra note 14, at 748–
57. 
174. Smith & Martinez, supra note 7, at 131 (stating that “[s]ystem dysfunction can often 
be attributed to failure to adequately involve and acknowledge the interests of key 
stakeholder groups”). 
175. See MACRO, supra note 167 (“Working with over 700 people around the state, the 
ADR Commission developed a consensus-based Practical Action Plan titled Join the 
Resolution.”).  This Practical Action Plan is still in effect in Maryland.  See id. 
176. Smith & Martinez, supra note 7, at 131. 
177. See Reporter’s Notes, Comments made by Stacey Platt at Marquette University 
Law School Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond (Sept. 23–24, 
2011) [hereinafter Platt Comments] (discussing “What Do Stakeholders Want & Need—
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probably highest for those that do not have the resources that would 
allow them to access services.  These stakeholders also have the least 
leverage to influence the design of the ADR program.  Therefore, 
identifying and including party-surrogates—such as Domestic Violence 
(DV) advocates, attorneys for the child, and legal aid attorneys—is 
essential. 
E.  The Design Process 
The process of how the final decisions will be made with regard to 
the shape of the proposed ADR program must be clearly defined.  A 
consensus-building process that includes a broad committee with 
representatives from all of the important stakeholder groups may be 
lengthy, but it will also ensure broad-based support that is more likely to 
provide long-term stability.178  A different approach, which may be more 
efficient and appropriate in other jurisdictions, would be to require that 
the individuals assigned with the task of designing the ADR program 
gather the various perspectives and synthesize them into a coherent 
recommendation that takes the various gathered perspectives into 
account.179  Either approach will also require political buy-in. 
The ADR committee members, whether consisting of a large group 
of stakeholder representatives or a smaller committee, must understand 
the various perspectives and needs of their counterparts and how they 
may be impacted by the proposals that are to be evaluated.  Particularly 
where changes to an existing program are involved, there is a need to 
understand the evolution of the system that is already in place: what is 
working, what is not working, and why it is or is not working.  Similarly, 
identifying who may be invested in the status quo and how to overcome 
resistance to change is also a critical step.  Probably most critical to the 
design or reform of a new ADR program is identifying and responding 
to the existing institutional constraints, such as legislative and budgetary 
ones.180 
 
Parties & Lawyers?”). 
178. See, e.g., MACRO, supra note 167. 
179. Smith & Martinez, supra note 7, at 146–47 (discussing reforms made in the 
Northern District of California ADR program).  
180. Id. at 131–32. 
17 - BOYARIN-11 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2012  10:41 PM 
1034 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:993 
F.  Underrepresented Stakeholders 
Conference attendants emphasized some of the considerations that 
apply to those who tend to have the least voice in the process design, 
such as pro se litigants, poor litigants, and often those who are both; 
children; and domestic violence victims.  Including the considerations of 
those who are impacted most by the ADR system and yet lack the 
opportunity to participate in the system design process is essential.  
Indeed, the process design itself is a significant juncture and where self-
determination takes place.181  While this Report does not attempt to 
summarize all of the possible considerations that may impact the design 
of an ADR system, it will include a brief discussion of the 
underrepresented stakeholders that were emphasized by conference 
attendees. 
1. Children 
Although children are often not designated as parties in many family 
ADR processes, the process may have the most significant impact on 
them, even more significant than on the adult parties to the conflict 
themselves, usually parents or legal guardians.  Moreover, the state has 
a particular responsibility toward children; while parental rights are 
strongly valued and constitutionally protected, such rights are tempered 
by the state’s responsibility to guarantee the well-being of children. 
From a child’s perspective it is often (but certainly not always) best 
to settle early, before the court gets fully involved and the conflict 
becomes increasingly adversarial.182  In addition, durable solutions are 
also important to the well-being of the child.  For these reasons, 
litigation is often the least helpful process for children; it tends to last 
longer and can increase the level of conflict and relitigation.  Therefore, 
front-loading ADR services—services that may lead to quick and 
durable agreements and stable environments—would benefit children 
 
181. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Dispute System Design and Justice in 
Employment Dispute Resolution: Mediation at the Workplace, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 
2–5 (2009) (arguing that where party-stakeholders have no say in the design process, the 
intervention itself should provide for heightened guarantees of self-determination, as is the 
case with USPS’s REDRESS program where transformative mediation is utilized).  The 
design process is a fourth layer of an ADR system where self-determination can play an 
important role.  The other three are the characteristics of the intervention itself, how it is 
actually practiced regardless of the intended goals, and the manner in which parties are 
assigned to a given ADR process.  See supra Part V.B.   
182. Platt Comments, supra note 177. 
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most.  At the same time, it is essential that family ADR systems 
recognize that litigation is sometimes the only way to achieve finality 
and durability for the children and systems must be designed to respond 
to these circumstances as well.183  Moreover, settling early should not be 
done simply to expedite decisions and without fully investigating abuse, 
neglect, or both; DV; or other issues that may place a child in harm’s 
way.184 
Finding a way to include the voice of the children within the ADR 
process is also important.  There are risks involved in directly including 
children in court or ADR processes, but this does not mean that these 
risks should negate the importance of including children’s voices, 
particularly because there are ways to minimize the risks.185  Once again, 
the concept of a continuum can be helpful: the question of child 
inclusion does not have to be binary, either good or bad, but rather can 
be examined in terms of degrees, allowing for a convergence between 
the need to protect and to include children.  Including a legal 
representative of the child within the ADR intervention is one example 
of an intermediate approach, which requires that courts appropriately 
fund attorneys for children and fund their participation in the ADR 
intervention.  ADR interventions can also be designed to either center 
on the child’s needs or to include the actual voice of the child, either 
directly or through a professional trained to do so, which is the practice 
within some existing and innovative approaches to child-focused 
mediation.186 
2. Low Income and Pro Se Litigants 
Conference participants identified the following considerations that 
might apply to low income litigants, pro se litigants, or those who are 
both.187  First, the ADR system must include incentives for pro bono 
 
183. Id.  
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. See Jennifer E. McIntosh et al., Child-Focused and Child-Inclusive Divorce 
Mediation: Comparative Outcomes from a Prospective Study of Postseparation Adjustment, 46 
FAM. CT. REV. 105, 105 (2008); Comments made by Loraine Martin at Marquette University 
Law School Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond (Sept. 23–24, 
2011) (discussing “What Do Stakeholders Want & Need—Lawyers and Parties?”). 
187. Reporter’s Notes, Think Tanks Two and Three at Marquette University Law 
School Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond (Sept. 23–24, 2011) 
(discussing “Impact of Socio-Economic Status” and “Self Represented and Unrepresented 
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dispute resolution services.  Similarly, a rethinking of fee structures must 
be considered in order to allow dispute resolution services to be 
provided to all parties across the board.188  This may involve charging 
families what they can afford in a sliding-scale model.  Second, the 
system must be designed to provide information, particularly to pro se 
litigants.189  The areas of information that need to be covered for 
informed choice-making should include the process itself, the 
substantive legal issues, and the impact of a given decision on the 
respective parties’ rights.  Indeed, the degree of self-determination is 
limited where the parties do not understand both the ADR process and 
how it operates within the broader court system, regardless of how well 
an intervention is designed.190  Third, a variety of ADR interventions, 
not just mediation, should be expanded to underserved jurisdictions, 
and the interventions must be targeted to match the parties’ needs in 
order to ensure that these parties’ resources—time, money, and 
emotional resources—are conserved.  Along these lines, a more 
comprehensive suggestion made during the conference was to convene 
and facilitate a public policy discussion on justice that would name the 
inequities, and identify related positive and negative characteristics in 
ADR and in the courts.  Fourth, parties should be getting some form of 
emotional support to help them through very difficult processes.  
Integrating therapeutic and interdisciplinary approaches within the 
family law system can have a major impact on this front.  Overall, active 
steps should be taken to ensure that parties are not overwhelmed by the 
power of the system.  Special care must be taken to ensure that parties 
who lack resources are not overwhelmed by the professionals who have 
a preexisting relationship with each other.191 
 
Litigants”). 
188. This approach is not the only way to deal with the costs of ADR programs.  
Including court staff as neutrals, as well as judges performing ADR services, can alleviate the 
financial costs of participating in ADR interventions. 
189. Macfarlane, supra note 31, at 936–39.  
190. See, e.g., Reporter’s Notes, Comments made by Judge Michael J. Dwyer at 
Marquette University Law School Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and 
Beyond (Sept. 23–24, 2011) (discussing “What Do Stakeholders Want & Need—Court and 
Neutrals?”); Reporter’s Notes, Comments made by David Levin at Marquette University 
Law School Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond (Sept. 23–24, 
2011) (discussing “What Do Stakeholders Want & Need—Court and Neutrals?”); McMullen 
Comments, supra note 53. 
191. Mayer Comments, supra note 73.  
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3. Domestic Violence  
The example of the DV advocates’ response to mediation can 
illustrate the importance of including DV advocates as stakeholders in 
the design process of any family ADR intervention or system.  Initially, 
DV advocates opposed mediation where DV was present because they 
were concerned that individuals suffering from DV would be coerced 
into agreements that were not good for them.192  They were also 
concerned over the possibility that victims will be re-victimized by being 
in the same room as the offender and by being forced to engage with the 
offender directly; for the physical safety of the victim during, before, and 
after mediation; and that the mediation itself could lead to more 
violence.193 
Much has been written and can be said about DV in the context of 
family cases, and family ADR in particular.  The following is a very 
modest attempt at summarizing the elements of a broad framework for 
safe management of DV cases in family ADR (many of which might 
apply to areas outside the ADR context).194  Family ADR programs 
should provide thorough training to those who work within them: 
judges, lawyers, court administrators, and ADR interveners.  Such 
programs should implement a meaningful195 screening process that: (1) 
identifies incidents of violent acts and other types of coercion; (2) 
analyzes the characteristics of such instances, differentiating between 
 
192. See Rene Rimelspach, Mediating Family Disputes in a World with Domestic 
Violence: How to Devise a Safe and Effective Court-Connected Mediation Program, 17 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 95, 96–100 (2001) (summarizing the arguments against mandatory 
mediation in cases that involve domestic violence). 
193. Id. 
194. For a more detailed discussion of DV and ADR, see Nancy Ver Steegh, Gabrielle 
Davis & Loretta Frederick, Look Before You Leap: Court System Triage of Family Law 
Cases Involving Intimate Partner Violence, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 955, 968–71(2012); see also 
Nancy Ver Steegh & Clare Dalton, Report from the Wingspread Conference on Domestic 
Violence and Family Courts, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 454, 460 (2008). 
195. Questions about our current ability to quickly and reliably identify cases and 
understand the implications of domestic violence for the purpose of decision-making about 
participation in a dispute resolution process persist.  See Ver Steegh, Davis & Frederick, 
supra note 194 at 987–88 (concluding that while court-connected triage poses problems, so 
does the status quo under the linear, or tiered, approach); Ver Steegh & Dalton, supra note 
194, at 460.  Moreover, if proper and thorough screening is viewed as a condition precedent 
for safe management of DV cases, what margin of error are we willing to accept?  Ver Steegh, 
Davis & Frederick, supra note 194, at 965–66 (illustrating hypothetically how triage can have 
a potentially major negative impact on victims of domestic violence)   
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the various types of DV and determining the implications of these 
differences; (3) assesses the parties’ realistic options in light of this 
analysis; and (4) channels DV cases to the appropriate intervention by 
allowing the parties to make their own informed choices regarding the 
type of court intervention they will receive, ADR or otherwise.196  
Moreover, ADR programs must provide DV victims with interventions 
that first and foremost create a safe environment where the danger of 
coercion by the offender is negated but also that do not exasperate the 
risks inherent in DV cases, such as increased future violence.  Finally, 
such programs must provide referrals to other resources that might be 
needed.  This brief outline of a framework is only meant to reiterate 
how proper treatment of the issue requires a deep understanding of the 
problem and dedication of the right resources.   
G.  Ensuring Longevity 
One way to promote the longevity of ADR programs is to convene a 
design or reform process like the one described above.  Such a process is 
likely to result in broad-based support for ADR programs with clearly 
defined goals, to strike a balance between the various perspectives and 
often competing goals, and to lead to a stable funding source and 
authorizing legislation.  However, legislators, court administrators, and 
financial realities change, so continuing efforts of lobbying and 
education will always be necessary.  Validating the programs through 
research—in terms of the level of the parties’ satisfaction, fairness, and 
efficient use of resources, to name a few key areas—is essential.  
Conversely, not being afraid to change, improve, or even abandon 
programs that do not work effectively is also important. 
VII.  LOOKING FORWARD 
Parties in dispute that enter the court system do so out of necessity, 
due to their inability to resolve their issues on their own.  As a 
consequence they give up a certain level of their autonomy.  In the 
family arena, parents may lose some control over their private family 
arrangements as a result of the court’s authority and responsibility to 
 
196. Ver Steegh, Davis & Frederick, supra note 194, at 989–91.  Allowing parties with a 
history of DV to make their own choice appears to be in tension with the assignment process 
under either the tiered or triage approaches, which may assign or decline to assign parties to a 
process without the appropriate level of consideration needed in cases that involve DV.  Id. at 
986–87 (discussing party self-determination in the context of process choice). 
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ensure the best interest and welfare of children.  In the civil arena, 
parties may be forced to leave their home, give up on a family business, 
or lose their financial autonomy.  While parties give up a certain level of 
their autonomy, often the best resolutions of disputes are those shaped 
by the parties themselves.197  The courts must play a significant role in 
providing parties with adequate services that lead to appropriate 
resolutions, whether through ADR or otherwise.198  Courts have a 
responsibility to ensure that the parties they serve get the right kind of 
intervention and of the highest quality.199  Courts also are responsible for 
guaranteeing that the ADR interventions they sanction provide for 
guarantees of fairness and justice.  Overall, this requires that courts 
ensure that ADR programs are properly designed, funded, assessed, 
regulated, and supervised. 
The primary barriers to the broad implementation of such programs 
can be summarized as follows: first and foremost, a lack of financial 
support and, second, a lack of clarity in defining the goals of court 
ADR—goals that need to strike an appropriate balance between 
fairness, justice, effectiveness, benefits to the parties, and efficiency.  
More generally, an investment in the status quo—by judges, attorneys, 
and even at times by ADR administrators and neutrals—is hindering 
the needed changes from taking place. 
The conference and this Report are just the beginning of a much 
broader effort to expand and reform court ADR.  The following are 
some practical steps—all of which were either mentioned explicitly by 
conference participants or directly derived from their comments—that 
can be taken in support of such important efforts. 
A.  On a National Level 
Uniform efforts, such as lobbying for federal legislation that would 
encourage the development of ADR programs, can have an impact 
across jurisdictions. 200 
 
197. See Welsh, Mother’s Laugh, supra note 24, at 454. 
198. See Brazil, supra note 24, at 132; McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 159, at 6–7. 
199. McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 159, at 6–7. 
200. The existing efforts on this front of ACR, an organization that sees lobbying as part 
of its mission, should continue and get reinforced.  See ASSOC. FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 
http://www.acrnet.org/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2012). 
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Conducting more research, empirical or otherwise, will help ADR 
providers improve their services as well as put them in better positions 
to promote ADR and educate the relevant stakeholders about it. 
Efforts must work within law schools to promote education reform 
to include ADR training.  Related to such efforts, it is also important to 
write academic articles that promote ADR reform and implementation. 
Continued efforts must be directed at gathering information about 
what is happening throughout the country—for example, the types of 
programs in place, how they were put in place, and how funding and 
support are being secured—and directed at effectively sharing such 
resources with those interested.201  Similarly, designing particular pilot 
programs, such as an intake or triage system, and creating a way to share 
the results with others can be a useful resource. 
Efforts, such as those RSI is currently engaged in, to identify local 
and national ADR organizations and initiatives and to maintain a 
network of information-sharing and support for jurisdictions engaged in 
reform efforts can further bolster and help expand the reach of ADR. 
Maintaining a database of easy-to-use blueprints for convening an 
ADR design and ADR implementation process based on the successful 
experience of other jurisdictions would also help promote the expansion 
and reform of ADR. 202 
With a view to the future, some participants called for working 
toward redefining the judicial mission as being responsible not just for 
case management but also for “conflict management.”203  This broader 
mission would include out-of-court, pre-court interventions to resolve 
conflict as well as in-court prevention programs such as specialized 
courts, drug courts, mental health courts, unified family courts, and 
ADR programs. 
B.  On the Local, Jurisdictional Level 
Cultivating alliances with the various stakeholders with an eye 
toward starting an ADR reform process is essential. 
Law Schools within the jurisdiction may be able to provide some of 
the resources and expertise needed to help with reform efforts.  
 
201. See COURTADR.ORG, http://courtadr.org (last visited May 2, 2012). 
202. See id.  
203. See Reporter’s Notes, Think Tank Five at Marquette University Law School 
Symposium: The Future of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond (Sept. 23–24, 2011) 
(discussing what’s the vision of court ADR in 2030).  
17 - BOYARIN-11 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2012  10:41 PM 
2012] A TIME OF CRISIS, A TIME OF CHANGE 1041 
Convening conferences with a complete or partial emphasis on local 
ADR issues, like the one convened at Marquette that is the subject of 
this Report, may be another useful way to initiate a reform process.204 
Jurisdictions are in various stages of ADR development and have 
various needs.  Each jurisdiction might consider creating a committee 
charged with first studying and then working toward expanding and 
reforming the existing ADR programs within their jurisdiction.  
Identifying the right individuals for such a committee with diverse 
professional backgrounds and with clout is important.  Securing funding 
for such a process is also crucial. 
*** 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Those who work in the ADR field believe that ADR services are 
essential to the well-being of individuals, families, businesses, 
communities, and, by extension, our society as a whole.  We must stay 
focused on providing the best services possible within the court-context 
and insist on striking the right balance between the institutional goals 
and the potentially distinctive contribution that ADR has to offer to 
those in conflict.  This will require a clear vision of why ADR is 
important, an articulated vision that will define how ADR should be 
practiced, and sustained work toward supporting these visions.  In order 
to remain true to the mission of helping parties navigate their most 
difficult challenges, we must ensure that the answers to why and how 
ADR is practiced remain in the forefront. 
 
 
204. For example, the conference at Marquette included a half-day solely focused on the 
future of Family ADR in Wisconsin.   
